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One of the fundamental philosophies of 'early' cyberpunk literature written in the 1980s 
until the mid 1990s was the belief that human consciousness was trapped in the prison of 
the body. Building on the articulation in William Gibson's seminal novel Neuromancer 
(1984) that the human body is "meat", early cyberpunk authors theorized in their fiction 
the mind breaking free from the trammels of the flesh by mapping itself onto a virtual 
realm, or, cyberspace. By interfacing with a computer, humans transplant a digitized 
mind into the non-physical space of a cyber-system, escaping from the limitations of the 
body and achieving ultimate flexibility of identity in the mutable world of cyberspace. 
The result of this postulation was a cyberpunk ontology that excised the importance of 
the body for subjectivity and humanness, leaving the mind as the lone signifier of 
humanity. Theorists diagnose this ontology as 'posthuman'- a divergence from 
embodiment towards network of consciousness with computational machine. This 
philosophy is problematic, however, as it elides the practical, material, and 
epistemological significances of the human body. This thesis analyzes the responses 
amongst 'post' cyberpunk authors (1995-current) to the bedrock philosophies of 
disembodiment and digital mind existence made by 'early' cyberpunk authors. I argue 
that post-cyberpunk authors such as Richard K. Morgan, Pat Cadigan, and William 
Gibson (revising claims made in his early work) reintegrate corporeality into the 
ontologies posited in the literary genre, elucidating a new posthuman subjectivity that 
allows for embodied social agency in the material realm and embraces the body as an 
indelible site of human identity in the cyberpunk schema. 
The first chapter gives a history of the evolution of the cyberpunk genre and situates the 
particular political and postmodern cultural occurrences that the literary form was/is 
responding to. Additionally, the first chapter explores the various ontologies posited by 
both early and post-cyberpunk. The second chapter examines the concept of the 
'posthumanist artificer', or self-authored embodied subjectivity, in Richard Morgan's 
Altered Carbon. The third chapter engages Pat Cadigan's Tea from an Empty Cup as an 
example of virtual existence impacting corporeality and the impossibility of full 
immersion into cyberspace. Finally, the fourth chapter argues that William Gibson's post-
cyberpunk novel All Tomorrow's Parties is a treatise on the return of posthuman users 
from cyberspace escapism into embodiment, and the concurrent emergence of digital 
entities into physicality. 
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Kyle A. Wiggins 
Introduction 
Social doomsayers and cynical prognosticators pronounced shortly after literary 
cyberpunk burst onto the sub-cultural scene in the early 1980s that the genre was already 
dead. Andrew M. Butler declares in his study of the genre that "cyberpunk died in about 
1986, if not before" (16).' hi a sense, those critics were right. Cyberpunk has always 
been a terminal vehicle. The genre has a penchant for skepticism towards popular culture 
and 'high' art as mediums that quickly appropriate subversive practices and ideas, 
rendering them gutted and listless commodities. Once cyberpunk became popularized in 
the mainstream (in the same way punk music was absconded with in the middle of the 
night), then it was doomed to smolder out. By the late 1980s, cyberpunk was seen as a 
genre that was formulaic and oft imitated in other science fiction sects, and effectively 
labeled by critics and its progenitors as lifeless. The cutting edge social philosophies of 
cyberpunk (those that viewed humans as machine counterparts to industry, marginalized 
hacker groups as the revolutionary scribes of the postmodern, and cyberspace as the 
alternative to reality where autonomy could be restored) became peddled in mass 
consumerism markets. The sheer popularity of cyberpunk literature and ethos was faddish 
shortly after its zenith in 1985 and blase by 1986. Some vestigial artists continued to 
produce cyberpunk literature utilizing the core positions well into the 1990s, though 
discussions of the genre's relevancy to society died out. In a way, cyberpunk played out 
its own trope in even the most sympathetic of imderground discourse communities; the 
screeching cyberpunk body (of literature) had flat-lined and the mind (the philosophies) 
had moved on to better things in cyberspace. The transplantation of humanity from 
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physical space to cyberspace was one of the most important stances of cyberpunk at its 
peak, and remained so even into the 1990s literature. The real battle for representation of 
liminal, oppressed, and disenfranchised 'punks' wouldn't happen in reality, but would 
take place in virtual reality (cyberspace). By this token, critics charged cyberpunk from 
both decades with disengaging with material issues, essentially turning tail and running. 
Thus, the continued insistence on cyberspace as a viable alternative to reality actually 
substantiated one of the major critiques of cyberpunk and legitimized the obituary of the 
genre: where does the human body fit into this? 
Interpretive work charting the mortality of the literary genre of cyberpunk must 
take note of another kind of murder that took place in the pages of individual cyberpunk 
texts, which explored and privileged a disembodied human consciousness. In fact, literary 
cyberpunk participated in and even helped to generate a critical fear of the body in late 
twentieth century discourse. For example, the cyberpunk of the 1980s and 1990s, 
henceforth referred to as 'early' cyberpunk, made aesthetic ideological distinctions 
between embodied identity and the virtual extension of a mind that could roam 
unimpeded in cyberspace. Little concern was paid in the texts of early cyberpunk to the 
flesh, with the result that tacit contempt for the body was elevated to the level of theme 
and rejection of the human form's contribution to identity became a standard of the 
genre's aesthetic ideological philosophies. If cyberpimk fiction cultivated a body in the 
works of its New Wave antecedents, then with the arrival of William Gibson, Bruce 
Sterling, and Greg Bear, that body was laid out upon the morgue table as a cadaver. 
Cyberpunk pressed on, exploring the transplant of the mind into cyberspace, constituting 
individuality as a series of digitized components. When cyberpunk suffered its 'passing' 
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in critical and publishing circles by the end of the 1980s, rather than abandon the form, a 
handful of steadfast loyalists continued to push the philosophies of the genre, standing by 
their art as the ontological expression of information age subjectivity. Artists like Neal 
Stephenson and Paul J. McAuley carried cyberpunk well into the 1990s, both writers 
operating under the ideological standard that the human body did not influence identity, 
and that the future of humanity lay in the versatile cybernetic mind. 
It is certain that contemporary criticism has embraced modes of thinking that 
destabilize fixed boundaries of the body. Interrogations into materiality have produced 
scholarship including Donna Haraway, N. Katherine Hayles, Claudia Springer, Chris 
Gray, and most notably Judith Butler's, which resists static categorization of the body as 
completely epidermal. Butler notes in Bodies That Matter that her inquiries into the 
demarcations of the human form led her to incorporate the abject and peripheral into 
definitions of the body: "Not only did bodies tend to indicate a world beyond themselves, 
but this movement beyond their own boundaries, a movement of boundary itself, 
appeared to be quite central to what bodies 'are'" (ix). Butler theorizes the flexibility of 
somatic borders by recognizing that the flesh is vital for human subjectivity. This is not 
the same project of possibility that the cyberpunks undertook. Rather than concerning 
themselves with delimiting the body, the early cyberpunks sought to shed it like a 
burdensome weight. They endorsed a mind/body dualism that Butler does not, taking 
postmodern positionality into, as Bruce Sterling notes, the visceral realm of technology. 
Since, as Fredric Jameson has famously noted, the postmodern condition 
disallowed individuals an ability to precisely situate themselves spatially within urban 
totality, thereby divesting them of the ability to see how they fit into economic and social 
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systems, cyberpunks retreated into virtual spaces that purportedly held possibilities for 
location and agency. For instance, the protagonist of Neal Stephenson's Snow Crash lives 
in the sarcophagus-like confines of a storage vestibule in wasteland Los Angeles, with 
only enough room for his bed and computer. Yet, when he jacks into the "Metaverse" 
(Stephenson's cyberspace), he escapes the reality of his shrunken domestic funhouse and 
is transported into the spacious confines of the virtual-club he owns and operates. 
Stephenson's character theorizes a better consumer and proprietary life, and is able to 
enact it in virtual reality. 
Subjectivity in cyberpunk literature was contingent upon the expansion of the 
mind, free from corporeal incarceration. But this emotovistic utopianism does not 
reconcile the implications of leaving the body behind to exercise the mind. My reading of 
cyberpunk literature does not hinge upon an analysis of bodily extension, but is 
concerned predominantly with the process of bodily erasure. Why did the cyberpunks 
seek to elide the flesh, casting off as a shackle the corporeal anchor to reality? More 
importantly, can the human form be rethought into cyberpunk discourse as an integral 
element of subjectivity? 
The aim of this project is, in effect, a resuscitation of the cyberpunk body that 
died, a death that itself prefigured the demise of the genre. I argue that, through a charting 
of shifts in the genre's understanding of the ontology of human embodiment, 
contemporary cyberpunk artists have begun to explore a new technological philosophy 
that explodes reductionist views of corporeality and reconstructs the human body as a 
tool for reclaiming an agency previously unavailable to the fractured postmodern subject. 
In my analysis of cyberpunk's return to the body, I theorize that individual sovereignty is 
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a theme explored and made possible in the genre by utilizing cybernetic and informatic 
technology to engender versatility in the corporeal site, rather than deploying the same 
technology towards the eradication of the body, and ultimately humanity. 
Varieties of rogue shifts away from the ontology of disembodiment in cyberpunk 
have taken place within the last few years. The immense popularity of The Matrix films 
speaks to a philosophical re-emergence of bodily importance. The films depict a 
hallucinatory virtual world (the eponymous 'Matrix') that has blinded individuals to their 
social and economic reality. Subversive movements liberate individuals from the virtual 
lie by 'unplugging' them and replanting their consciousness back into the body. The veil 
lifts, and cognizance of their nightmarish existence dawns on subjects as they awaken 
from the cyberspace dream of freedom from the body. When Morpheus awakens him to 
"the real world," Neo is shocked to leam that the whole of humanity exists cocooned in 
fluid sacks while their energy is siphoned away for use in an unseen machine world. The 
body had been utilized as a fiiel mechanism for the disenfranchising machine rulers, 
making humans into slaves, distancing them from their bodies; they have, in essence, 
been placed under the spell of virtual space that inoculates and insulates the individual 
from the horror of their bodily reality. Only when it has been reclaimed does 
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corporeality's importance for ontologies of subjectivity become clear. 
While The Matrix films have carved out a place in popular culture in which ideas 
of the cornputer-mediated cognition have superceded notions of the bodily inscription of 
identity might be rethought, multiple cyberpunk authors have crafted a dissenting 
literature within the genre. The concerned texts represent a resistance to the dominant 
cyberpunk trope that AR Stone describes as the "decoupling of the body and the 
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subject.""^ The thesis is organized around analyses of Richard K. Morgan, Pat Cadigan, 
and William Gibson's representations of somatic importance within the cyberpunk field, 
and the seditious philosophical transition that is underway in contemporary cyberpunk 
texts. 
The first chapter, "Vacationing in Virtual," is meant to provide an overview of 
the cyberpunk genre; history, trajectory, and the major tenets of the genre. My desire to 
situate the economic underpinnings that catalyzed the cyberpunk movement as a literary 
and social philosophy necessitates some discussion of the cultural conditions present at 
the genre's genesis and at the moments when ontological shifts occur within the 
discourse. I will show how William Gibson's introduction of contempt for the body as a 
prison in Neuromancer constructed the groundwork for projects of corporeal escapism in 
cyberpunk. Ultimately, those breaks with the body were scuttled by egregious 
manufacture of Utopian cyberspace and political and social realities that undercut the 
idealisms of the early cyberpunks. Also, the chapter aims at exploring a reintegration of 
discarded liberal humanist theories alongside existential theories of the posthuman. 
Drawing on Katherine Hayles work on digital identities, the ontologically interested 
textual amalgam that I call 'posthumanist cyberpunk' represents a shift within a literature 
that once elided possible agency in the vehicle located in the human body toward a new 
subjectivity capable of rearticulating the self via corporeality. 
In the second chapter, "'Resleeving' the Body in Cyberpunk," through my 
analysis of Richard Morgan's Altered Carbon (2002) I argue that cyberpunk has formed a 
new epistemic relationship with cyberspace that casts virtual technology as a 'purgatory' 
rather than emancipatory forum. As a reflection of political factors characteristic of late 
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capital, theories of digitizable consciousness that might engender social motility have 
been redeployed as effective and utilitarian only when located within the context of the 
body. Virtual technologies have been implanted within the flesh, conceptualizing the 
human form as a privileged element of humanity, and one capable of participating within 
subversive practices. Morgan's work signals a death of essentialist theories perpetrated in 
cyberpunk literature, namely, the Cartesian mind/body duality. Altered Carbon reflects a 
new posthuman subjectivity that reinstates agency in the form of personal sovereignty. 
Further, Morgan's text is evidence of new cyberpunk ontology of human embodiment 
dedicated to a philosophical hybrid of post human and liberal human tenets. The hybrid 
ontology grants choice in subjectivity to the subject, offering the possibility of corporeal 
(and subjective) reconstruction capable of voicing resistance. Altered Carbon introduces 
us to a new philosophical and literary character, the re-animating artist of the body in 
cyberpunk; the posthumanist artificer. 
Chapter three, "Clothing Lost Souls," moves beyond discussions of individual 
subjectivity in cyberpunk to examine cyberpunk's representations of late capital's use of 
information technologies. Through an analysis of Pat Cadigan's Tea from an Empty Cup 
(1998), I posit that hazards of the alienated worker in the information age are represented 
in posthumanist cyberpunk as a disembodied specter. Also, the Baudrillardian 'simulacra' 
technologies that jeopardize tangible human contributions to labor in the digital age are 
potentially remedied through 'semi'-autonomy. Through implantation of virtual 
technologies, cybernetic augmentations, and digitizable consciousness, the human laborer 
expands the possibility of his or her control in the labor force, increasing the 'value' of 
corporeal workers and destabilizing the myths that humanity is an inferior laboring vessel 
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to machine. The purportedly empowering 'metanarratives' that Lyotard sees as defining 
markers of postmodernism, collapsed in the form of cyberspace mythologies, are called 
into question by revealing the instability of the economic system.^ This revelation is 
carried out by questioning the ramifications of intemet/virtuality-driven work, and the 
impact on human subjectivity. By 'owning' the flesh and the cybernetic components, 
workers in posthumanist cyberpunk can exact fiscal agency upon the Ideological State 
Apparatuses that earnest employees towards disembodiment. The chapter explores how 
virtual existence actually impacts reality-based elements of identity, most importantly 
that of nationhood. Cadigan's characters employ cyberspace to stoke questions of 
national boundaries and corporeally-signified nationalities while engaged in a trans­
national, boundary-less, digital setting. 
The fourth chapter, "The 'flesh-ghost in Market Street'", re-examines the 
philosophies of William Gibson's cyberpunk visions, as they maps ontological shifts in 
notions of human embodiment from corporeal decadence and escapism in his early work 
to the embrace of the flesh as subversive tool in his novel All Tomorrow's Parties (1999). 
Gibson's revision of his theories on the body's role in modem subjectivity exemplifies 
cyberpunk's breaking fi-om escapist or virtual-centric camps, and shift towards embodied 
discourses. I will show how Gibson's novel destabilizes his earlier, fiindamental posture 
of an informational humanity that is instantiated in the global network as pure code, and 
turns the position about face towards informational instantiation in the material world. 
Dissidents no longer flee hermit-like into cyberspace in defiance of world systems, but 
rebel against oppressive ideologies by realizing a new self, drawn in virtual space, in the 
tangible realm. Gibson understands that disruption of a Deleuzian network of control can 
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be carried out by a subject in ownership of his/her subjectivity. He speculates that 
modem informational technology can be used as a causeway towards greater individual 
elasticity, resulting in what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a 'body-without-organs'; a 
body free from social discipline and organization. 
Donna Haraway claims that the increased role of information technology and 
cybernetics in the world has made "the boundary between science fiction and social 
reality ... an optical illusion" (149).^ We can look at the futures theorized in science 
fiction as the promises that invade and dictate our reality, further diluting the distinction 
between the "real" and the "imaginative." Steven Shaviro says it best: Science fiction 
"involves both the present and future, while being reducible to neither. For science fiction 
is about the shadow the future casts upon the present. It shows us how profoundly we are 
haunted he the ghosts of what has not yet happened" (250).^ My examination of 
cyberpunk is not meant to predict the future, but is a meditation on the possibilities of 
technology to transform embodiment, providing a new treatise on the significance of the 
body's impact on subjectivity. 
The following chapters are not meant to close tight the door on core cyberpunk 
philosophies that seek to transcend the human body. I am quite certain that many artistic 
participants in the genre still consider cyberspace to be a viable alternative condition to 
our present one. However, assaults upon early cyberpunk's problematic erasure of the 
body offer new possibilities for human identity. Cyberpunk anticipations of a self-
authored subjectivity at the site of the body are important not only for new inroads 
swathed in postmodernism, but also for theorizing the applicability of cybernetic 
technology to efficacious social resistance in late capitalist/information age reality. 
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' In Andrew M. Butler, The Pocket Essential Cyberpunk. Great Britain; Pocket Essentials, 2000. 
^ In Bruce Sterling, Mirrorshades: The Cyberpunk Anthology. New York: Ace Books, 1986, p. xiii. 
^ By subjectivity, I mean the process of originating and existing in the individual mind. The subject is a 
product of social and historical forces that, in concordance with poststructuralist theory, decenters the 
subject from conceptions of completely centered unification. However, the conditioning of humans by 
heterogeneous market forces is not without fissures. Resistance to branding of the body and creation of 
technological utility allows for agency to be inserted between the gaps of corporate messaging. The 
subjectivity discussed in this thesis can be partially owned, making the individual a pseudo-author of her 
relation and place within the world. 
In A.R. Stone, "Will the Real Body Please Stand Up?: Boundary Stories About Virtual Cultures" in M. 
Benedikt (ed.) Cyberspace: First Steps (London: MIT Press, 1991). 
^ In Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1984), p.xxxiv. 
® In Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge, 
1991. 
^ In Steven Shaviro, Connected, or IVhat It Means to Live in the Network Society. Mirmeapolis: University 
of Mirmesota Press, 2003. 
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Chapter 1 
Vacationing in Virtual: 
Cyberpunk s Prison Break from the Flesh 
The postmodern' climate from which cyberpunk emerged in the early 1980s 
emblazoned a discernible impression upon the literary genre. The term itself, 
"cyberpunk," is a locus of ostensibly disparate elements, thrust together in a merger that, 
by virtue of its cultural centrality, demands critical attention. By analyzing the 
components of the genre, semantically and thematically, cyberpunk can be situated in a 
way that allows us to understand why Fredric Jameson lamented over his omission of the 
literature from his seminal study Postmodernism, or. The Cultural Logic of Late 
-J Capitalism. Cyberpunk's critical standing as a quintessential postmodern literary 
formulation stems from not only the context in which it was conceived, but also from the 
fundamental commitment of the genre to functioning as a textual site wherein 
contemporary and discarded discourses/philosophies are refurbished and brandished as a 
new expression of an anti-establishment revolution. Specifically, liberationist theories 
and the noir exposure of corporate greed in the decadent urban space are recycled from 
1930s detective fiction and early technocratic literatures grappling with mechanical 
reproduction. Thus, any discussion that aims at recalibrating the standing of cyberpunk 
within a postmodern schema needs to backtrack and map the foundational tenets of the 
form. 
Traditionally, the 'cyber' elements of cyberpunk have received the majority of 
critical focus. The prefix 'cyber' is derived from 'cybernetics', biological, mechanical, or 
informational control systems governed by technology. However, the genre has come to 
be identified and defined mostly by an exploration of cyberspace (also called the net, 
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web, matrix, grid, or Virtuality, among others), thus cyberpurtk. More specifically, 
cyberspace is a virtual environment generated by a computer (program) capable of 
integrating the human user into digital reality. Computer usage dominates the narratives, 
as humans transfer their consciousness on a variety of levels into (or onto) cyberspace, 
typically by jacking in through sockets located at the base of the neck, the spine, eye 
sockets, or through a VR chip implanted in the head. I will return to this integration of 
machine in body momentarily; however, it is interesting to note the departures cyberpunk 
literature has taken from banal internet usage in its current state. Viewing the computer 
screen does not satisfy the virtual experience the populace of cyberpunk texts seek; 
instead, full immersion into the virtual environment is desired. Hence, it is 
understandable that discussions of cyberspace often focus on the alternate reality created 
and traversed by hackers. Purportedly, cyberspace offers a landscape that can be 
navigated and lived, not just observed. Tech-sawy and orthodox technophobes alike in 
cyberpunk have implemented cybernetic systems with mediums other than the computer. 
The body itself is a network rife with possibilities for upgrade. Pertinent texts are 
freckled with information gatherers and criminals seeking an exaggerated advantage by 
installing cameras, optical augmentations, or microbiological devices within themselves. 
Humans embrace cybernetics not only as tools but as holistic realities that lend another 
significance to the 'cyber' in cyberpunk. 
The 'punk' element of cyberpunk is a surprisingly more ambiguous term, as the 
cultural and historical reference points that attach to the term 'punk' seem to be in 
constant flux. One criteria of the punk moniker comes from cyberpunk's propensity to 
center narratives around urban youth subversives who wield computer hacking skills and 
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cyberspace authorship as their counterrevolutionary contributions. Unlike golden age 
science fiction, or even much New Wave, that focuses on stock scientists or cardboard 
middle-class suburban representatives, cyberpunk headlines skaters, gutter punks, 
musicians, jaded military AWOLs, drug users/dealers, artists, and of course, hackers. The 
punks represent street cultures and lower-class 'deviants' capable of articulating a 
legitimate critique of the status-quo and economic systems that accelerate 
disenfranchisement in late capitalism. To panic the limited ideals of Western society 
under the logic of late capital, cyh&cpunks deployed resistance through the creation of a 
virtual environment and the piracy of data. In this manner, cyberpunk is a relatively new 
project that facilitates use of technology outside the academy or scientific elite, all done 
within a science fiction tradition that previously focused predominantly on the initiated 
'haves. 
Yet, the 'punk' component of the genre has as much to do with a narrative style as 
with the characters that people the texts. While the stylistic influences have undergone 
repositioning in contemporary cyberpunk, the bedrock associations remain clear. 
Building off of the frenetic pacing and frantic angst-ridden screams of punk music in the 
late '70s and early '80s, cyberpunk adopted a caustic tone and jagged prose that reflected 
the short and loud diatribes of its musical counterpart. Further, the dialogue of authors 
like Pat Cadigan and Bruce Sterling was discemibly terse, often dubbed 'street-wise' in 
its authentic representation of punk slang and attention to movements of the urban 
underbelly. Influenced by bands like the Sex Pistols, The Clash, MC5, and the New York 
Dolls, early cyberpunk literature found permission for the welding together of fi"actured 
or distanced styles. The transposition of punk dispositions and philosophies onto a 
14 
discourse as atomized as cybernetics is evidence of the artistic project to make a 
progressive social statement from the aftermath of the unexpected cultural collision.^ The 
breakdown of hierarchy that postmodernism foretold and celebrated is played out by 
societal misfits utilizing complex informatics or computer systems Cyberpunk is a point 
of contestation where ivory tower esotericism blends with proletariat utilitarianism. As 
Sabine Heuser notes, it is precisely this "unusual and unprecedented clash of high-tech 
with 'low life' that accounts for the particular flavor of cyberpunk."^ 
As an ongoing task, cyberpunk revamps its voice again and again by throwing 
different genres into the fray. Similar to The Clash drawing upon Rastafarian musical 
traditions to emphasize punk music's composite nature, cyberpunk literature cannibalizes 
other genres. Brandishing a rusted and fractured narrative structure, early cyberpunk 
flaunted its rearticulation of disparate styles (including noir, detective fiction, and 
westerns) and their subsequent radical compilation in new representation. In the works of 
William Gibson and other noteworthy voices of cyberpunk, the hacker figure is often 
referred to as a 'cowboy.' The title emphasizes the nature of sub-cultural computer 
hackers as liminal figures or boundary crossers between high tech and outcast sects. The 
cowboy image also plays up the western frontier myth that is the self-selected literary and 
cultural background to cyberpunk, resurfacing, as Heuser notes, "as a new and more 
interior frontier between man and machine, situated within cyberspace" (xxxiii). In other 
instances, hard-boiled investigative protagonists invoke detective fiction authors such as 
Raymond Chandler or Dashiell Hammett. Tropes of capitalist corruption and two-
dimensional corporate demons represent the black market of the near-friture setting, 
exposing the dark side of wishfril techno-utopias that overrun much of science fiction. 
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Only the boundary-crossing hacker/punk/sleuth, who has been ingratiated in this seedy 
side of urbanity, can subvert the economic exploitations, barkening the future narratives 
back to the noir revision of romanticized Los Angeles of the 1930s. Ridley Scott's Blade 
Runner (1982), a cinematic foray into the future dystopia of L.A., is often cited as a 
prime exemplar of cyberpunk's assembly of genres, as well as an epitome of pastiche. 
Defined crudely as parody without content, pastiche is mimicry of genres or art 
forms, employed, according to Jameson, without the intent of making a statement about 
social conditions or historicity. Jameson determines that pastiche is a "statue with blind 
eyeballs" (17), unconcerned with producing a salient parallel to prior contexts since the 
potpourri of intertextuality is a superstructural extension of postmodernism itself. Put 
differently, in the cultural logic of late capital postmodernism is a representation of that 
economic base (postmodemity) that appears as a mosaic of styles stripped of their 
contextual significance. According to Jameson, to say that postmodern art's (like 
cyberpunk's) pastiche tendencies create postmodernism is to put the cart before the horse. 
This is not to say that history has been erased. Instead, history operates as a set of styles, 
a "depthless" mode of accessing the past "through stylistic connotation, conveying 
'pastness' by the glossy qualities of the image, and the '1930s-ness' or '1950s-ness' by 
the attributes of fashion" (19). History, in the postmodern, has undergone a repression 
that Jameson sees as traumatic.^ The onus is put upon the critic to wade through the 
continual stylistic homages that supposedly offer little statement about the context the 
work was borne out of, and elucidate the market forces or "political unconscious" 
represented in the text, often mediated through a reaction to technology. I am of the mind 
that history has not been buried so deeply under references that one must look past them 
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in order to see the true "value' of a text, but that those references are at times crucial in 
understanding the junkyard mentality cyberpunk professes to use in redefining society 
and resistance. However, Jameson is lucidly on-target when he claims that the rhetorical 
situation of postmodernism that cyberpunk objected to is "the internal and superstructural 
expression of a whole new wave of American military and economic domination 
throughout the world" (5). Adam Roberts points out that "the postmodern subject for 
Jameson, determined as ever by social circumstance, necessarily reflects the increasing 
Q 
reification and fi"agmentation of late capitalism." Along with dragging historical context 
to the surface of postmodern critical theory and unpacking the signifiers of fragmented 
existence, what follows is a brief illumination of the reactionary statements made by 
cyberpunk to political regimes of the 1980s, showing how new economic and political 
relationships to governing technologies have spurred a new concept of resistance to the 
"decentering" of the postmodern subject within literature. 
In brazenly overt modes, burgeoning cyberpunk literature directly engaged the 
political agendas of the Reagan administration and the fallout of Thatcherite nationalism, 
both neo-liberal projects that proffered the deregulation of government and heralded the 
rule of the market resulted in conditions that reduced collective responsibility (of the 
nation, community, government) and formed a breeding ground for corporate entities to 
subsume cultural identities. Franchises used technological advances in information 
systems (like global communications and the nascent internet) to advance their 
penetration of world markets. The Reagan administration pushed legislation that 
furthered fears among U.S. cyberpunk authors of the 1980s that the nation was becoming 
a Petri dish for corporate mergers. National identity was teetering dangerously close to 
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product branding, exacerbated by the fact that, according to Naomi Klein, "Reagan's 
term saw the ten biggest [corporate] mergers in American history up until that point- and 
not one was challenged by the FTC [Federal Trade Commission]."^ hi 1983, Reagan put 
into action his plan to reduce government's regulatory role by reducing the staff of the 
FTC and undercutting the organization's ability to combat giant corporate mergers and 
anticompetitive actions. Not coincidentally, Bruce Bethke's story entitled "Cyberpunk" 
was published the same year in the November issue of Amazing Science Fiction Stories. 
This was the first time that the term 'cyberpunk' had been published, and critics and 
artists alike flocked to the term as the banner under which 'punk science fiction' that 
explores cybernetic technology will operate. Bethke's story codified an artistic movement 
that had begun brewing early in the Reagan era, offering a title for fiction exploring the 
possibilities for cultural liberation in a world dominated by corporate entities and 
technology.Predictably, the punk sensibilities of Bethke's work and others like him 
were boisterously oppositional to the unfettered capitalism that had become a reality. I 
will return, in greater detail, to the dialogue between cyberpunk and the information 
marketplace in the third chapter, though for now, the new science fiction entity known as 
cyberpunk would be discussed in the coming years as an art form conscious of the 
dangers of neo-liberalism, adopting a punk ideology that cast one eye warily upon 
emerging technologies while maintaining hope for a technologically energized future. 
From Bethke to the most heralded authors of cyberpunk fiction, William Gibson 
and Bruce Sterling, along with Greg Bear, Tom Maddox, and Lewis Shiner, the major 
aesthetical and critical tenets of the literature were established by the mid 1980s. Partially 
responsible for the 'punk' epithet, the protagonists of novels such as Mindplayers 
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(Cadigan, 1987) and The Artificial Kid (Sterling, 1987) railed against corporate 
imperialism, declaring an anti-establishment project that was located in a putatively 
counter-hegemonic form of cyberspace. The youthful protagonists, participants in punk 
subcultures of the sprawling urbanity that defined the near-future of cyberpunk, saw in 
cyberspace a forum in which voices could be galvanized in opposition to mega-corporate 
branding of all free space and individuals. Free from print costs or geographical 
dislocation, cyberspace was instantly and readily accessible to all who wished to combat 
the cadres of capitalism that contributed to disenfranchisement. hi a practical sense, 
resistance took the form of organizing virtual communities of dissenters, and, more 
subversively, by hacking the databases of corporate or governmental agencies, hindering 
the institution's ability to disseminate (mis)information or product. By tuming 
cyberspace away from its use value as a tool of capitalist product trafficking and 
information auction, cyberpunk fiction furthered a punk music culture trope of retooling 
and redeploying the products of Western consumer capital.^' Also, in recognizing the 
potential that cyberspace had for the establishment of anti-authority movements, so-
called cyberpunk crossed the boundaries of high and low art by involving low-life 
characters in the discourse of high-tech. Boundary erasures in postmodernism of high 
art/low or mass-culture art are paralleled by cyberpunk's high-tech and low-life 
juxtaposition. 
In a related effacement effort, cyberpunk from the 1980s and 1990s attempted to 
eradicate the stark lines of the human body. Cyberpunk protagonists often took a 
deconstructivist approach to the body. Characters were driven to alter their bodies, either 
through cybernetic implants or biological mutilations derived from technological 
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advances. In Jack Womack's Ambient (1987), non-mutant individuals develop an affinity 
for the social outcast victims of nuclear fallout. The alterations carried out by the non-
Ambient (non-mutants) make a productive statement about the social matrix that drove 
them to create bodily camaraderie: "By altering the body in unappealing ways and thus 
becoming voluntary, the non-Ambient might not only find kinship but could well 
demonstrate the iniquity of a society that forced one to do so" (68). Conversely, the 
hacker-cowboy characters arm the body with the aforementioned jacks or cybernetic 
sockets so that they might create a union with the computer. By equipping the human 
body with technological tools, the boundary between human and machine is blurred, 
making it difficult to demarcate the beginning and end of each. The dualism of 'artificial' 
and 'real' is deconstructed in cyberpunk, and what emerges from the wreckage are two 
ontologies that I am most interested in explaining and, ultimately, writing: 1) the machine 
(or computer)/human interface; 2) the human body as fleshly prison. 
One of the conditions that information technology in its infancy created through 
its 1980s penetration into popular culture was speculation that humans would soon merge 
with their machines. The personal computer was an especially mythological apparatus in 
creating the discourse of the computer/human interface that early cyberpunk was so 
fascinated by. As computer terminals began to play a more prominent role in industry and 
the capitalist market, humans found themselves spending greater amounts of time 
working on their PCs. For many employees, entire vocations rested on the utilization and 
mastery of the computer, the tool that would no longer amplify product servicing, but 
would in fact generate product altogether. Marxist critics pointed out the nightmare 
alienation of the worker fi-om his/her work was manifested in computer-driven industry. 
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What was produced was not tangible, and the hands of the typist rarely left the keyboard. 
Humans were becoming one with their computers. This behavior was encouraged in the 
neo-liberalism of Reagan and Thatcher-eras, since technology would supposedly topple 
restrictive borders that halted the world market from developing into a forum of global 
participation. Ultimately, cyberpunk authors exaggerated this economic mode, 
highlighting in their fiction the idea that when humans are wedded to their machines, 
humanity itself is shaken up. We, as humans, have moved on to a new subject position 
that can be characterized as the posthuman. 
The posthuman subject can be defined in a variety of ways, most of which are at 
play in cyberpunk fiction, however the common theme is a union of the human body with 
a machine/computer. Katherine Hayles writes in her fantastic discussion of the subject. 
How We Became Posthuman, that "in the posthuman, there are no essential differences or 
absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic 
mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals" (3).'^ The 
meltdown of biological and mechanical differentiation became a touchstone for 
cyberpunk literature as the defining characteristic of humanity's state of being. For 
Gibson and Sterling, the human body had taken the first step to collapsing into the 
computer. Thematically, their works postulated that the human form was itself a 
computerized format in late capitalism, and thus, new modes of synergizing the human 
with the machine were underway. Why, though, did cyberpunk maintain an unflagging 
penchant for literary expression of human/computer interface? 
The answer, in part, comes from the other fundamental element of early 
cyberpunk. Market and economic conditions that drove human workers to multitasking 
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jobs mediated by the computer prompted cyberpunk authors to wonder if the human body 
was, in actuality, an inadequate form of existence. Computer systems and resources could 
be updated in the event of technological advances or the looming threat of obsolescence. 
The terminals were more effective in relaying information and could process data at a 
capacity that dwarfed human capacity. Also, institutions in both the public and private 
sectors were redefining job parameters to accommodate machines that could replace 
human counterparts. However, these trends were not unique to computerization 
breakthroughs of the mid '80s and early '90s. Fordism and the implementation of 
assembly lines in the early twentieth were catalysts for similar paranoia surrounding 
humans' replacement as the agents of industry. Nonetheless, the aggravated 
computational importance and resulting worker alienation in service industry niches 
seemed the final nail in the proverbial coffin for the "pure" human body in late 
capitalism. As economist Daniel Cohen points out, "the entire history of the twentieth 
century could.. .be retold as the dehumanization of the world."''^ Cyberpunk literature, 
perpetually concerned with railing against the exploitation of humanity and 
marginalization of the lower class by corporate giants, engaged these issues overtly. 
The most celebrated and cited example of the exploration in cyberpunk literature 
of the theme of post-industrial dehumanization is found in the genre's seminal novel, 
William Gibson's Neuromancer. Released in 1984, Gibson's novel is often credited as 
the text that garnered cyberpunk its tremendous readership as well as growing critical 
attention. Though Gibson was reluctant to claim responsibility as the progenitor of 
cyberpunk, there is no denying that Neuromancer engendered literary merit for and 
scholarly devotion to the genre that is normally withheld fi:om science fiction. Many 
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cyberpunk texts have drawn inspiration from Gibson's philosophical meditations on the 
trajectory of late capitalist culture, the consuming glut of urbanization, and punk 
temperament that glorified the digerati hacker subversive. Further, Gibson's exploration 
of a virtual environment that functioned as a navigational tool for data and 
communication, known for the first time as "cyberspace," broke new ground in literary 
representation and in technology vernacular as a near-fully realized concept. The 
importance of cyberspace as a venue for counter-cultural revolution cemented Gibson's 
representation as a harbinger of the information age.^^ His definition of cyberspace as a 
"consensual hallucination" was prescient in anticipating the world-wide utilization of the 
internet, as well as the technology's eventual entrance into the realm of the banal. Yet, 
Gibson's text also foregrounds a distinct ontology that would define his genre. In addition 
to cyberspace, the Gibsonian theme that has surfaced most often in cyberpunk is bodily 
deconstructivism. 
When we are introduced to Neuromancer's protagonist, Case, one of the first 
usefiil pieces of information we learn about him is that he is a console "cowboy," a data 
hacker of reputation, "one of the best in the Sprawl."^^ Case is presented as an authority 
figure, a representative of the subversive underworld of data thieves, and by extension, an 
emissary for anti-corporate resistance. Hence, when Case returns from a brief entry into 
Gibson's cyberspace, it is quite telling that he is disgusted with his fleshly existence; "For 
Case, who had lived for the bodiless exultation of cyberspace, it was the Fall. In the bars 
he'd frequented as a cowboy hotshot, the elite stance involved a certain relaxed contempt 
for the flesh. The body was meat. Case fell into the prison of his own flesh" (6). 
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There are multiple bedrock elements of cyberpunk that are exemplified in this 
scene. First, the experience of being jacked into cyberspace offers the user a bodiless 
existence that is preferable to the stifling malaise of embodied life. Consciousness, in 
Neuromancer is deployed into cyberspace, causing an individual to forget their fleshly 
reality and enjoy a digitized identity that is transcendent. Secondly, if virtual existence is 
exalted bliss, life in the human body is the antithesis. Flesh is the form of the biblical 
Fall, a punitive jail that would be shed if possible. Fortunately for Case and his fellow 
hackers, the opportunity for escape comes in the form of cyberspace. Flesh is a "prison" 
because, like the camal and crude "meat" that it is likened to, it is limited, terminal, and 
prone to decay. Cyberspace is the alternative. It is a clean, upgradable, inorganic realm 
that can facilitate the ultimate expression of posthuman identity possible: the pure mind. 
Case and the other members of the cowboy bar satiate their contempt for their bodies by 
fleeing them, breaking free from their corporeal jailers and allowing their minds to 
articulate identity in infinite ways in cyberspace. By positing the body as "meat," 
Neuromancer defines flesh as a commodifiable object, both eradicable and expendable. 
This ontological stance leads to a third implication: an elided importance of the body's 
impact on subjectivity. Case believes that he returns, time and again, fi-om cyberspace 
unchanged, with his identity as "Case" intact even when he breaks from his body. More 
to the point, were he to escape the prison of his flesh and exist exclusively in cyberspace 
(an adventure he attempts on more than one occasion, each time with more daring 
longevity), he would remain himself with no real ramifications emerging from this 
discarding of the body. Subjectivity, according to this philosophy, is not ensconced in the 
flesh. Only the pejorative rotting capabilities of the flesh define identity, but that can be 
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shorn once the subject is digitized in cyberspace. Case champions a cyberpunk ethos, 
reinforced in the works of Gibson's followers, that in virtual space "data [is] made flesh" 
(16) and the corporeal is usefully erased. 
Since Gibson is most often anointed the brewer of cyberspace discourse, it is 
worth explaining why cyberspace provides the genre with an alternative to embodiment. 
Put simply, cyberspace, or virtuality in other texts, is the forum of possibilities. There are 
few sociological rules that govern the virtual environment; in most instances, the 
restrictors are mathematical, physical, or computational in nature. Nevertheless, users are 
free to construct virtual identities in any gender, race, or pseudo-physiological context 
they desire, hi many ways, cyberspace is the antidote to confining social schematics of 
reality that seek to brand individuals with corporate logos or compartmentalize them 
within, for example, gender roles. Since cyberspace offers a chance for rearticulation, 
humans who have been victimized by disenfranchisement or economic exploitation 
become creators of their own reality. The flexibility of the program caters to imagination 
and creativity, as well as individualized expression. 
If we retum to the earlier lament over worker alienation via the increased role 
played by computers in the work force, we can see why cyberspace was such an alluring 
narrative setting for Gibson and others in the 1980s and 1990s. Recalling the punk 
principle of tool redeployment, cyberpunk artists became infatuated with the possibilities 
of computer-generated altemative realities partly because those same technologies were 
impugning human value. If the human form was made insufficient for postmodemity by 
computers, how could one resist that marginalization by redirection? For Gibson, the 
answer was to formulate resistance through cyberspace. Other authors, like Neal 
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Stephenson, took the anti-corporate resistance a step further, representing cyberspace, or 
in this case the "Metaverse," as corporate-free environment. In his novel Snow Crash, 
Stephenson ampUfies the cyberpunk anticipation of a sprawhng corporate metropohs that 
has subsumed the U.S. The narrative takes place in a Los Angeles that has been 
transformed into a series of miniaturized nation-state suburbs that are pitted in direct 
social and economic competition with corporate-run communities known as 
"franchulates."'^ Stephenson tragically and humorously represents the fallout of 
globalization and neo-liberalistic economics that paved the way for franchised national 
identity and a tidal wave of homogenized urbanity. Stephenson's virtual champion, the 
aptly named Hiro Protagonist, has been reduced to living in a cramped storage unit, a 
testament to the appropriation of available space by multinational conglomerates. 
However, the tight living quarters are not without benefit, since the storage unit is 
equipped with a fiber optic uplink to the virtual world of the Metaverse. Analogous to 
Gibson's cyberspace and nearly all other conceptions of virtual environments, the 
Metaverse is a computer mediated landscape that aims to fulfill its egalitarian promise. 
Hiro makes sure of this, since he is one of the creators of the technology. Dissatisfied 
with his reality, Hiro constructed the Metaverse as a sanctuary safe from corporate 
inscription and rule. There are no brands in the Metaverse, since the space (equivalent to 
bandwidth) is monitored and distributed by Hiro and his fellow hackers. It is not 
available to companies that would monopolize the locales or peddle products. Instead, it 
is an escapist laboratory where individuals may construct their identities in whatever 
form they wish, and they may trade information in the Metaverse's open-market without 
financial regulation of government. It is the free space that neo-liberalism thought it 
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could generate, but failed. Essentially, the Metaverse is a reactionary outcry to a world 
that does not accommodate punk subcultures without absconding with them. The 
corporate culture spies, or "gargoyles," infiltrate the music and hacker scenes that Hiro 
frequents, leaving him and his community no refuge in reality. The narrator punctuates 
the climate early in Snow Crash-, "when you live in a shithole, there's always the 
Metaverse, and in the Metaverse, Hiro Protagonist is a warrior prince" (63).'^ In short, 
Stephenson's virtual environment presented a Utopia counter to the dystopic urban 
eyesore of L. A. Interestingly, characters of Snow Crash spend a great deal of time in the 
Metaverse as a means of transcending not only their unfulfilled existence in reality, but 
also escaping their human frames. When Hiro jacks into the Metaverse, he ceases to 
"exist" in his flesh ("Hiro's not actually here at all. He's in the computer-generated 
universe" (24)). In the rationale of the novel, the flesh can be discarded and subjectivity 
(as Hiro) remains undisturbed. 
Perhaps in no other text is the desire for corporeal escapism more resonant than in 
Jack Dann and Gardner Dozois's cyberpunk anthology Beyond Flesh. Published in 2002, 
Beyond Flesh is a monumental gathering point not only in cyberpunk discourse, as many 
of the genre giants are contributors, but also as a mise en scene of transcendent energies 
centered on expanding the possibilities of humanity. Editors Dann and Dozois assembled 
the collection with the desire to explore the possibilities of moving beyond the 
provincialities of the human flesh. All of the anthology's short stories touch upon the 
inadequacies of the human body in one form or another, granting the mind or 
consciousness a privileged position as the crucial element of humanity that must be 
excavated and salvaged from the decaying corporeal vessel. Echoing the philosophical 
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positions of Gibson and Sterling, the editors of Beyond Flesh crafted a multifarious 
response to the problem of the fetters of the body. In the introduction, Dann and Dozois 
announce to the reader that the included tales "show you what it might be like when 
human consciousness is no longer restricted to the prison of the flesh, or the basic human 
form."'^ By predominantly including cyberpunk artists (such as Michael Swanwick and 
Greg Egan), Dann and Dozois amplify the insistence in cyberpunk fiction that the human 
body is an article that may be elided and that subjectivity is grounded in mental 
capabilities independent of physiology. 
In his story "Ancient Engines," Swanwick utilizes one of the fundamental 
mythologies surrounding cyberspace and the inculcation of technology that leads to 
bodily escapism: immortality. Even in the earliest stages, cyberpunk touted the promise 
of neo-immortality if the consciousness was mapped onto cyberspace and the body was 
set aside. At other junctures, cyberpunks threw their lot in with alternative vehicles of 
technology (robots or data streams) into which the human mind could be downloaded and 
relocated whenever need be, effectively guaranteeing 'immortality' provided any 
dependence upon organic elements (for identity or otherwise) was overcome. Swanwick 
writes in this mode, positing that a "mech" (mechanized humanoid, absent of any organic 
component) could live forever, as long as upgrades were performed. A stranger in the 
barroom setting acts as the story's foil to the would-be immortal mech. The stranger 
addresses the human body as if it were a mechanism or system on the verge of extinction: 
"Death is inherent in flesh people. It seems to be written into the basic program- a way, 
perhaps, of keeping the universe from filling up with old people" (86). Swanwick invokes 
a bedrock argument and fear within cyberpunk, that humans are analogous to computer 
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programs and that some revolution must take place in the face of overpopulation or 
overcrowding in the metropolis. Humans are a terminal vehicle out of necessity. If one 
could escape the dependency upon physical space (in the form of the human body), then 
issues of urban swell could be circumvented. Thus, a reliance upon machined/computer 
technology grants individuals a way out of their entrapment. Since humans are 
conditioned to die, the passage also acts as a lament over corporeal limitations. Further, 
presenting flesh as an inferior program to the continually upgradeable and durable mech 
form is strikingly similar to the recognition that humans are becoming inadequate 
components within the workforce. The basic computer programs that augment the 
capabilities of service industry workers are not hard-wired to terminate or rot. They are 
written to embrace upgrade and extension. Yet, the human body has been reluctant that 
evolve into a program that easily accepts prolongation. Listead, that drive is located 
within the mind, perpetually seeking elevation or escape from a leaking house made of 
tissue. By depositing the mind within technology, "humanity" purportedly assures itself 
of an unassailable virtual morphology. 
Greg Egan's contribution to Beyond Flesh draws more heavily upon cyberpunk 
themes of identity displacement onto a virtual space. In the case of "Learning To Be Me," 
the first-person narrator grapples with his fear that the cultural practice of downloading 
consciousness (and all of one's feelings, emotions, memories, and personality) into a 
cybernetic "jewel" that replaces the brain actually disrupts human subjectivity, and 
eradicates any semblance of humanity. The jewel is superior to the organic brain because 
it will not decay, become riddled with Alzheimer's disease, or perish with the downfall of 
the body. Instead, the jewel may be networked with computer systems, guaranteeing 
consciousness extension beyond mortality. The narrator, however, is skeptical about the 
procedure, and remains the only member of his family or fi-iends wholly "human." He is 
aware of the impact corporeal erasure and conscious expatiation may have on 
subjectivity. He asks if after the surgical procedure, "would you still be 'yourself?" or 
would you be the jewel mimicking you (54)? Eventually succumbing to social pressures 
and cognizance of his impending death, the narrator decides to go through with the 
procedure. Shockingly, the narrator perceives a shift in his temperament and personality, 
however, he knows he has not yet been through the procedure. Alarmed, he discems that 
the only explanation is that he had switched and the effect of the jewel's implementation 
was so thorough, he could not differentiate between it and his organic predecessor. This 
strain of thinking dovetails into panic that he could not prove that he ever possessed a 
brain, or, that he had not always been the jewel (a human/computer interface). 
Understandably left in a panic over his ontological existence, the narrator decries "/W lost 
control. My body had turned into a living straightjacket" (58). Egan examines the 
cyberpunk conception of the flesh as a prison, noting that even possessing a cybernetic 
component (the jewel) is not enough to rid the subject of the trammels of the body. 
Complete escape is the only method of emancipation from the postmodem onslaught of 
heterogeneous forces that erase choice (even over brain matter) and constitute identity. 
The narrator opines after the realization that he was/is the jewel, "I had always been 
powerless. My will to act upon 'my' body, upon the world, had always gone straight into 
a vacuum, and it was only because I had been ceaselessly manipulated" (59-60). The 
narrator recognizes the loss of his agency in the late capitalist world and, instead of 
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seeking resistance to these forces within his flesh, accepts subjectivity within the jewel 
technology that might liberate him. ("The jewel is immortal. The brain is decaying" 64). 
Like many of the fundamental tenets of cyberpunk, Egan's tale lauds the human 
mind as the exclusive element of humanity and thus, postulates an affinity with 
20 Descartes' cogito ergo sum. In fact, the narrator resurrects the Cartesian philosophy as 
an amelioration of his corporeal prison: "I suggested that the notion of human 
consciousness as 'software' that could be 'implemented' equally well on an organic brain 
or an optical crystal was in fact a throwback to Cartesian dualism: for 'software' read 
'soul.'" (52-3). 
There is a concern with liberal humanism contained within the cyberpunk 
ontology that I want to return to later in this chapter however, it is useful to view Egan's 
piece, and the preceding cyberpunk texts, as reinstating the capacity for human choice 
and agency within consciousness. Yet, this reinstatement cannot occur concomitantly 
with the use of the human body. This was of course a minor concern for the participants 
of Beyond Flesh, since the flesh could be transcended through cyberspace, with identity 
remaining intact. The implication of these cyberpunk philosophies is extremely troubling 
to me (though I do recognize their productivity), as I am uncertain as to what remains of 
the human body. Clearly, corporeality in this version of postmodernism is of minimal 
importance to subjectivity. Why can't the human body be thought of as a site of 
resistance? Is subjectivity located exclusively within consciousness? How is the 
mind/body dualism complicated by notions of gender, racial, and sexual identity? Can 
subjectivity in cyberpunk discourse be rethought to conceive of the body as a subversive 
tool and an indelible marker of human subjectivity? My desire to answer these questions 
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has led me to look beyond regurgitations of cyberpunk status quo, and interrogate 
epistemic shifts that the genre has undergone. Not only have the cornerstones of 
cyberpunk fiction been tackled in direct confrontation by new voices within the genre, 
but also the merits of artistic reactions to social and economic epochs of the 1980s and 
1990s have experienced a revision that points towards a new philosophy, ontology, and 
subjectivity possible within a genre formerly known as cyberpunk. 
The new visions of cyberpunk philosophy are evident in the works of Richard K. 
Morgan, Pat Cadigan, and M. John Harrison.^' These three authors have participated in a 
shifting of the core cyberpunk tenets, which were forged in the genre's genesis, 
rethinking them as projects stripped of technological idealisms and negative relations to 
the human body. In recent studies, critics like Heuser and Andrew M. Butler have argued 
that the literature metamorphosed into something new. Unfortunately, neither critic offers 
a tremendously satisfying account of what this changed cyberpunk proclaims or even 
looks like.^^ I strongly believe, however, that three epistemic transitions have taken place 
within cyberpunk during the late 20*'' and early 21®' centuries. 
First, the cyberpunk conceit of positing cyberspace as a road to escapism from a 
corporeal prison is ripped apart in the new cyberpunk and exposed as an illusion of 
transcendence. Cyberspace lures the user into a false sense of infinite possibility or 
eternal life, an existence that is predicated upon maintaining a computer interface with 
the human body. Presence in a virtual landscape is made possible because of fleshly 
embodiment. As Heuser points out, "all movement and perception remains determined by 
a visual perception, and all brain activity still relies upon a body" (33). In other words, 
the body is the ineradicable link with the computer program, making linguistic or virtual 
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(digital) representations of escapism into cyberspace a fallacy. The body, as dissatisfying 
as it may be for cyberpunk protagonists,, is not an easily discarded shell that can be traded 
in for a digitized ethereal identity. It is the vital scaffolding of humanity. Thus, in a move 
of philosophical maturation, late cyberpunk artists, like Morgan and Cadigan, realize the 
shortcomings of positing subversive resistance in an ephemeral space (exclusively or 
dominantly), and recast the corporeal as the vehicle for negotiating the dystopic world of 
late capitalism. 
With the realization in mind that the body is a necessary element of identity in a 
cybernetic age, these artists began to conceptualize ways in which punk outcasts and 
hackers could scream back at the market or governmental forces oppressing them while 
using the body as a tool with as much efficacy as cyberspace. The body is no longer a 
prison of "meat" that must be escaped. In some cases, VR offers a temporary forgetting 
of human flesh, but the user always returns to the site of their body. The early discourse 
of cyberpunk, which held a disregard for the importance of corporeality in subjectivity, is 
revised to accept the human body as a form that makes a more resonant resistant 
statement than any identity in cyberspace ever could. K.W. Jeter's novel Noir (1998) 
captures the assault upon the human frame that corporations perpetrate, and the steps 
cyberpunk characters will take to reclaim the body as a denial and disavowal of corporate 
social potency. In Noir, the DynaZauber corporation is so effective in the conveyance of 
product messaging that their contribution to the "network" of information that circulates 
everyday life is inescapable. Individuals are captives to the caprices of the company. 
Consequently, the very flesh of a person is a medium of branding, essentially deployed 
strategically (and surreptitiously) to extend advertising. The egregious hijacking of 
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humanity at the behest of economic market competition is openly explained by one of 
DynaZauber's executives; "In the marketplace, at least, rape is the natural order of things. 
And remarkably popular, too, on both sides of the exchange. People hand over their 
money, their lives, to DynaZauber or any other corporation . . . the customers are always 
bottoms looking to get topped, the harder and bloodier, the better" (314-15). Jeter claims 
that market exchange at the corporate level is grotesquely violent and visceral. Jeter's 
protagonist, McNihil, detests the ubiquity of DynaZauber and their relentlessness within 
the information network. In response, McNihil gets "thin-film insertion surgery" in order 
to filter out the deplorable branded corporate world and see objects as though they 
appeared in a 1940s noir film (52).^^ The only tonic to the violation by the human body is 
to reclaim ownership of the flesh, equipping it to denounce corporate messaging, and 
thereby transforming corporeality into a means of resistance. Current cyberpunk artists, 
like Jeter, convincingly envision the body as a dissenting outlet, while also lucidly 
showing exactly what punk subculture is resisting against. 
An additional revisionist feature of contemporary cyberpunk is the fracturing of 
the line that compartmentalized cyberspace as set apart from reality. Cyberspace affects 
the human body analogue and vice versa. For example, the narrative of Pat Cadigan's Tea 
from an Empty Cup centers on a police investigation of a young boy who was found dead 
in a cyber cafe, or virtual-wired boutique. Apparently, the boy was "killed" in cyberspace 
and the impact left him deceased in reality as well. Cadigan blurs the distinction between 
virtual identity and real, creating a symbiotic relationship between the flesh and 
cyberspace existence that disrupts bedrock cyberpunk claims that the body 
inconsequential. Cyberspace exaggerates the potential of what can be accomplished by 
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humans, but contemporary cyberpunk artists see that potential most productively applied 
to reality and the human body. Tomoyuki Iguchi, of Cadigan's Tea, goes so far as to 
encode information gleaned in cyberspace upon his body and to brandish it within the 
real world. Cadigan emphasizes cyberpunk's need to redirect much of the subversive 
work done in virtual back towards reality. In short, the body is rethought into cyberpunk 
subjectivity and the possibilities of cyberspace are reeled back in from their lofty heights 
of separatist exclusivity. 
The second epistemic shift that has taken place within cyberpunk is closely linked 
with the recent trend to explore cybemetic/informatic possibilities within the body and 
reality. Defying the conventions of the genre, new takes on cyberpunk have depicted 
cyberspace as an appropriated extension of reality, replete with corporate-peddled web 
space, informational surveillance, and regulation of the data exchanges and identity 
parameters, hi effect, cyberpunk art of the late 20'^ and early 21®' centuries is a 
representation of the philosophical crumbling of idealistic egalitarian cyberspace. An 
instrumental usage of burgeoning internet technology for foundational cyberpunks was an 
exchange of information (otherwise forbidden or censored), set apart from the regulating 
specter of govemmental and corporate observation. That tenet could never fiilly come to 
frnition. Hackers who sought refiige from the sprawl in cyberspace sooner or later found 
their virtual haven administrated by a status quo, or invaded by corporations determined 
to purchase web space/sites and operate with economic propriety. Artists such as John 
Shirley and Rudy Rucker were somewhat prescient about the realities of their near-fiiture 
in which they would see the internet turned into a corporate playground, owned by 
globalizing agents rather than trafficked by desperate youths. However, most cyberpunks 
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of the '80s and'90s foresaw cyberspace as a way out of corralled life (similar to 
Stephenson's postulation that the Metaverse would be the unbranded rebuttal to the 
branded world). Few anticipated the historical, social and economic events that would 
transform cyberspace into both an extension of our economic actuality and a civil 
straightjacket. 
One of the reasons that corporate-free cyberspace has become a defunct theme for 
Morgan and his contemporaries is that the information age technologies that were 
supposedly reworkable into tools of subversion, in all actuality, became artifacts of hyper 
economic fluidity unparalleled in the period of late capitalism in the twentieth century. 
Economist Daniel Cohen explains this conception of the internet, "the new technologies 
that were brought to life by a generation of young people who thought they were 
criticizing capitalism.. ..Yet, rather than criticize capitalism, the new technologies gave it 
a 'new spirit,' a breath of new life" (2). The internet (and by extension ruminations on 
cyberspace possibility) was borne from an idealist dream of communicating free of 
charge. In 1978, two University of Chicago students linked the first modem in an attempt 
to circumvent telephone bills (and spatial inconveniences). More importantly, the 
intemet-in-infancy mode of communication deconstructed the hierarchies of corporate 
service providers and the (mostly ungrounded) fear of surveillance/phone tapping. The 
leveling of economic and social hierarchies in the workplace is, for Cohen, one of the 
defining logics of capitalism in the information age. Unfortunately, or predictably, the 
sheen on the egalitarian project did not last, and social realities make the world web a far 
different medium than the cyberpunk prognosticators wished. The horizontal accessibility 
of data, free from corporate filtration, in Gibson's Neuromancer is a far cry from the 
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actual distribution of information on the current net. Uplink to cyberspace is owned and 
maintain by multinational corporations, and the avenues of virtual travel are as riddled 
with billboards and advertisements as your average highway.^'' Vincent Mosco, in his 
terrific study of the mythologies surrounding cyberspace The Digital Sublime, has posited 
that internet communication has mutated into a breeding ground for capitalist entities. 
Mosco writes: 
The growing integration of communication sectors into a consolidated 
information and entertainment arena explains much of why there has been 
an unprecedented acceleration in mergers and acquisitions [of intemet 
agencies]. Communication systems in the United States are now largely 
shaped by a handful of companies including U.S-based firms: Microsoft, 
AT&T, General Electric, Viacom, and Walt Disney Corporation, AOL-
Time Warner, and the Liberty Media Corporation.. .Each of these firms 
also has a significant trans-national presence through outright ownership, 
strategic partnerships, and investment. (160) 
The mythos of cyberspace as venue for subversive reactionary statements is surely 
undercut by the rampant appropriation of the forum by trans-national entities. 
Cyberpunks defined their beloved intemet as a means to galvanizing disparate 
communities, as a virtual community. Much of the reasoning for locating the communal 
focal point in cyberspace was its notional 'distance' from the bombardment of 
advertisements that so thoroughly construct identity in postmodern life. Of course, the 
intemet is looked upon far differently by commerce giants than by ad-weary individuals. 
Many users have ingested the corporate modus operandi as the primary function and 
context of cyberspace. Bill Gates' comments regarding the intemet seem to reflect the 
tremendous popularity that cyberspace has as an economic exchange site, as against 
notions of it as a community activist fomm. Gates refers to the net as "the ultimate 
market" that hosts capitalistic dialogue and exchange.^^ Perhaps even more alarming than 
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the corporate influence on cyberspace is the governmental regulation and monitoring that 
has gutted the carte blanche project of data surfmg. The U.S. government, in stoking the 
xenophobic fire following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center, has mandated that web logs (or 'blogs') will now be monitored for incriminating 
evidence. Activist groups have been outspoken in opposition to the policy, claiming that 
surveillance of this magnitude violates free speech. In a more practical light, the monitor 
jeopardizes any remaining notions that cyberspace is, in fact, a free space that facilitates 
oppositional voices and resistant organizations. Historicizing this movement is important 
for understanding why recent cyberpunk narratives have reconstructed cyberspace as a 
dystopic miasma of surveillance, with responsibility placed upon legislative 
organizations. 
The trial of a Muslim webmaster has brought even more attention to the U.S. 
government's regulation of cyberspace. On February 26, 2003, University of Idaho 
graduate student Sami Omar al-Hussayen was arrested and charged with three counts of 
promoting terrorism under the umbrella of the USA Patriot Act. According to 
prosecutors, al-Hussayen helped set-up and register multiple web sites for the Islamic 
Association of North America (IAN A). The group publishes Islamic religious books and 
has not been marked as a terrorist organization, however prosecutors brought charges 
against the lANA because its website provided links to sites that allegedly recruited and 
raised funds for Chechen and Palestinian terrorist organizations. As webmaster, al-
Hussayen was supposedly implicated under the "expert guidance or assistance" provision 
of the Patriot Act. However, despite his webmaster status, al-Hussayen had no knowledge 
or control over the content of the site or the links. The charges that sought deportation as 
38 
well as punitive measures were dropped after six weeks of testimony. No clear link was 
established between al-Hussayen and terrorism, but the tightening of regulations on 
cyberspace is clear. Even bandwidth and web space providers are apparently at risk in an 
environment that once philosophically and ideologically privileged and supported free 
information exchange. Social critics who view the internet as jurisdiction of the First 
Amendment have declared the case a trampling of constitutional rights. In demonizing a 
proponent of cyberspace information and data trafficking, the neo-conservatives of the 
U.S. government have generated a fear of laissez fare technocracy that was produced two 
decades earlier under the deregulation-kick of a Republican administration. No doubt the 
surveillance of cyberspace by government has influenced contemporary cyberpunk 
authors, arguably giving them pause in perpetuating the anointment of the internet as the 
bastion of subversive resistance. 
This historical shift in social landscape is not meant as evidence that cyberspace is 
no longer pertinent to cyberpunk. Rather, it is meant to support my position that the 
idealisms conceming the liberatory possibilities of technology have waned, and 
cyberpunk artists have begun to consider new uses of virtual information networks. 
Cyberspace was/is crucial to any subversive task because the virtual environment 
celebrated diversity and displacement of the status quo. Frederic Jameson's 
characterization in Late Marxism of the postmodern Utopia strikes a remarkable 
similarity to the potentials of cyberspace: "a Utopia of misfits and oddballs, in which the 
constraints for uniformization and conformity have been removed" (102). Neal 
Stephenson's 'Metaverse' exemplifies Jameson's Utopia: "Your avatar [virtual persona] 
can look any way you want it to You can look like a gorilla or a dragon or a giant 
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talking penis in the Metaverse. Spend five minutes walking down the Street and you will 
see all of these" {Snow Crash, 36). Opportunity for possibility draws users to cyberspace, 
and it is the counteraction of the eclectic diversity of the space at the hands of 
homogenizing forces that seems to disconcert Morgan, Cadigan, and Harrison. Their 
reluctance to laud cyberspace and focus instead on corporeal resistance to government is 
the fallout of clenching of the (digitized) Invisible Hand. 
Reactions to unassailable institutions like trans-national corporations and the U.S. 
government are not the only points of contestation within the discussion of emancipatory 
cyberspace. New cyberpunk authors have engaged more personal ontological qualms 
regarding the shunning of the body in favor of a 'wholly'-virtual identity. Specifically, 
concerns over the ruptured synchronization of mind and body have led artists, most 
notably Cadigan and Morgan, to view cyberspace existence as a disembodied purgatory 
that erases vital aspects of humanity. This realization comes as the third major epistemic 
shift in cyberpunk. Essentially, a new importance has been assigned to embodiment. At 
the outset of How We Became Posthuman, Katherine Hayles asks what I view as the 
relevant cybernetic and philosophical question related to contemporary cyberpunk 
subjectivity: "How, I asked myself, was it possible.. .to believe that mind could be 
separated from body ?" (1). Hayles' query, contextualized within the discourse of 
cyberpunk, performs the following tasks: it acknowledges a long-standing tradition that 
believed it was possible to separate the mind from the body, accentuating a Cartesian 
philosophy that saw the mind as the seat of humanity. Also, the question interrogates that 
dualism, asking if it need be rethought as impossible. Hayles begins to answer this 
question both scientifically and ontologically. The latter most concerns me, and I attempt 
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to utilize whatever conclusions she reaches as a starting point for my readings of 'new' 
cyberpunk. What I want to call attention to is an epistemological return to the body. More 
than the impossibility of actually escaping the body (that was recognized earlier as an 
instrumental component of cyberspace immersion), the epistemic return marks an 
occasion for examining new constructions of subjectivity (subversive or otherwise) that 
are tempered by corporeal contributions in the works of Morgan, Cadigan, and Harrison, 
hi reclaiming the importance of embodiment, social and personal agency is situated 
within reality as an actual possibility, rather than an achievement available only in 
cyberspace. For these artists, cybernetic technology can no longer be relegated to 
computational or digitized vectors, but if it is to achieve a grandiose efficacy, it must be 
integrated within the human body and conscientiously utilized within our social and 
fleshly realities. 
The cyberpunk fiction that operated under the delusion of material erasure has 
passed in some quarters; we have arrived at a new discourse that does not function under 
that pretense. The chapters that follow situate an analysis of recent cyberpunk authors 
moving the genre in new directions, within an exploration of humanity in the information 
age. My aim of this project is to challenge the validity of bedrock cyberpunk 
philosophies, and to elucidate a new subjectivity that allows for social agency and 
embraces the body as an indelible site of subjectivity in the cyberpunk schema. Further, I 
want to push forward a representation of the tenets of what others had called 'new' 
cyberpunk, or post-cyberpunk. Those labels are incomplete to me, since they signal either 
a postmortem nod or the passing of a predecessor. Such thoughts would be misleading. 
Cyberpunk is not dead, nor have its contemporaries forgotten their antecedents. Many of 
the Gibsonian and fundamental elements of cyberpunk live on, others have been 
rewritten. However the new ideas about subjectivity that embrace the corporeal have 
resulted in a new epoch that I define as posthumanist cyberpunk. The posthumanist 
cyberpunk is an amalgam of the organic/computer posthuman, and the liberal humanist 
concept that an individual is proprietor of the self. Social agency for the posthumanist 
subject is created by an ability to map consciousness onto a cyberspace environment or 
upload consciousness into a different human organism, creating in both scenarios a 
reconstructed subjectivity in the hands of the individual. Individuals are the sculptors of 
identity, the authors of digitized and embodied Selfhood. The important break that 
posthumanist subjectivity makes from the posthuman is a fundamental recognition that 
embodiment is a vital criteria of humanity. 
The posthuman, which was earlier defined in a simplistic sense as the merger of 
man and machine, can be illustrated further, though always cited as an integral essence of 
cyberpunk identity. Posthuman subjectivity entails four major claims. First, the 
26 posthuman privileges informational pattern or digitization over material instantiation. It 
is a reduction of humanity to code lines of ones and zeros. Thus, we understand, in part, 
why the posthuman subjects of early cyberpunk were so infatuated with cyberspace 
identities and complete immersion into the virtual landscape. Secondly, posthuman view 
conceives of the body as a prosthetic that all humans (from the control center of their 
minds) manipulate. Augmenting or replacing the body with other prosthesis is simply a 
propagation of the process, and a phenomenon we are all accustomed to. Thirdly, human 
beings may be easily and seamlessly integrated with machines/computers. The absolute 
differences between bodily existence and computer simulation are blurred. Fourth, and 
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most important, drawing on Jameson and other postmodern critics who cite the authority 
of market factors, the posthuman subject is a collection of heterogeneous forces. As 
Hayles points out, "the presumption that there is an agency, desire, or will belonging to 
the self and clearly distinguished from the wills of others is undercut in the Posthuman" 
(3). 
Also at play in my concept of posthumanist cyberpunk is a reintegration of liberal 
humanism. I cast the usage of liberal humanism as a "reintegration" mainly because 
critics and writers alike have proclaimed a feud between cyberpunks and humanists that 
has sent the two sects scurrying for their respective comers.According to Michael 
Swanwick's "A User's Guide to the Postmodems" (1986), humanists concentrate on 
existential or philosophical issues endemic to (obviously) humans, while the cyberpunks 
rely quite heavily on technology, punk style and antagonism to authority, and a fully-
realized high-tech future, all in place of the androcentric concerns of humanism. Also, the 
merits of liberal humanism have fallen under the scrutiny of critics who saw the 
philosophy as proffering a dangerous univocality. The liberal humanist subject possessed 
a body but was not conceptualized as being a body. Themes of universality associated 
with liberal humanism egregiously erased markers of bodily difference such as race and 
sex. However, the utility of liberal humanism that I want to redeploy in conjunction with 
the posthuman is the possibility for personal choice. Counter to the late capitalist context 
of posthuman subjectivity that was inscribed and constituted exclusively by 
lieterogeneous influences, the liberal humanist, and thus the posthumanist cyberpunk, is 
capable of agency through conceiving of the individual as proprietor of his/her own 
person. 
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In Richard K. Morgan's novels Altered Carbon and Broken Angels, individuals 
exercise the ability to purchase new bodies for themselves, downloading a digitized 
consciousness into the new form. By owning the corporeal and the mind, and subjecting 
their identities to reconstructions of their own design, posthumans exemplify propriety 
over their subjectivity. The technological apparatus that links users to virtuality in 
Morgan's works are embedded within the flesh (within a cortical stack, to be precise). 
Virtual technology has returned to integrate within the corporeal, reworking the 
disembodiment that erased bodily subjectivity in earlier modes of cyberspace, here 
elevating digital/computer embodiment as the reality of humanity. Outlying social, 
market, and economic forces still inscribe humans in Morgan's world, but those 
influences are only partially responsible for existence in reality. The posthumanist subject 
possesses the capability to reconfigure identity in response or resistance to their world, 
though now in a more tangible and relevant manner than the escapist virtual 
ephemerality. In other words, the posthumanist cyberpunk subject is a suzerain being. 
The posthumanist ontology allows for ownership of identity, resulting in a new ability for 
humanity to refute invasive social powers in favor of self-created individuality. 
While I will return in greater detail to Morgan's representation of posthumanist 
cyberpunks in chapter 2,1 would be remiss if I did not address why this study does not 
focus in great detail on the figure of the cyborg. Much of the new ontology that I am 
attempting to outline, as you will see, can slip into semantic coupling with the cyborg 
definition. The literal cyborg is a synthetic being, or, a cybernetic organism. Any 
semantic battle is beside the point. As I discussed earlier, the cyborg being can be 
represented in a variety of circumstances, though the most common articulation is an 
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individual whose intent in bodily augmentation is to expand the limits of inadequate 
flesh. The cyborg is often visually identified, as the cybernetic additions call attention to 
themselves in their clash with the flesh. Here lies an effective difference. The cyborg (in 
most cases) is a compilation of parts without resonant unity. The posthumanist cyberpunk 
embeds or embodies virtual technologies within the flesh, creating a cohesion or 
synthesis. There is definite overlap between the two identities, which I acknowledge, 
however I avoid lengthy discussion of the cyborg also because of the focus of this 
project. Posthumanist cyberpunk, for me, is a controversial reaction to the politics of 
cyberspace and the disembodied projects of traditional cyberpunk. The new ontology is a 
contestation of the jettisoning of the human body that takes place in lieu of virtuality. 
Cyborg identity, on the other hand, seems a response to un-modified or purist 
conceptions of humanity, not those linked to notional computer spaces. Cyborg 
subjectivities, genders, and sexualities have been theorized extensively (though not 
exhaustively) by excellent critics such as Dorma Haraway and Patricia Warrick. 
Revisionist contributions to cyberspace-mediated identity in cyberpunk remain relatively 
unmined, and thus, it shall receive the bulk of my attention in this project. 
What is of interest and importance in posthumanist cyberpunk is radical new 
emphasis placed upon the flesh. The human body in this new ontological wave of 
Morgan, Cadigan, and Harrison has become as utilitarian and de-limited as its virtual 
counterpart of the '80s and '90s. In a productive discovery of literary representation, I 
have rethought cyberpunk's allergy to its body as a terminal phenomenon. Certainly the 
current offering promises avenues for existing in postmodern urbanity under the rubric of 
individuation. So often, humans seem eager to apply technologies to outer realms, rather 
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than asking what impact they might have on provinciahty. By calibrating the importance 
of the human form as the crucial vehicle of agency, the art of posthumanist cyberpunk 
thankfully engages corporeal provinciality as its overt subject matter. 
' Due to the variegated uses of 'postmodernism' and 'postmodemity', I want to clarify my usages of the 
terms in this work. I employ the term "postmodernism' as descriptive of the particular epoch that follows 
modernism. As many of the seminal cyberpunk texts that this chapter examines were written in the 
formative early years of the 1980s, I think it important to discuss the social and economic conditions that 
produced (or expedited, as it were) those novels. Further, my use of Fredric Jameson's theories on the 
epistemology of postmodernism works to contextualize cyberpunk as a reinforcement of, or, reaction to, 
political factors of the age. Secondly, I use the term 'postmodemity' as indicative of the movements within 
the cultural field (specifiically of the United States). The ontologies of 'postmodemity', as espoused by 
cyberpunk artists, have undergone great revision in recent years, most notably reincorporating elements of 
modernism and liberal humanism. Thus, the crux of this thesis concems the philosophical transformations 
cyberpunk has made for the sake of outlasting the deceased discourses of postmodernism it claimed earlier. 
In summary, it is cmcial to analyze the epoch of the genre (postmodemism) in order to understand 
cyberpunk's theorization of it (postmodemity), and the resultant reformation of that theorization. 
^ Jameson regrets not including a chapter on cyberpunk precisely because he views the science fiction 
subset as "the supreme literary expression if not of postmodernism, then of late capitalism itself." In 
Fredric Jameson, Postmodemism, or. The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke UP, 1991) 
p.419. Such an endorsement fi^om a theorist like Jameson ushers cyberpunk to the contemporary critical 
table, even if a bit belatedly. 
^ One would find evidence of this technology in John Bruimer's The Shockwave Rider {\915), William 
Gibson's Neuromancer and Pat Cadigan's Mindplayers (1987), to name a few. 
'' Andrew Butler rightly points out the measures that middle-class, middle-aged cyberpunk writers have 
taken to sidestep shades of hypocrisy or boundary overstep in their deference of the 'punk' element in favor 
of the 'cyber': "Some writers, such as Greg Egan, sensibly leave this punk element out of their fiction and 
concentrate on the possibilities of the virtual (computer- or mathematically- generated environment) or the 
post-human (augmented thought process, without quite being the human-machine combination that 
constitutes the cyborg)." In Andrew Butler, The Pocket Essential Cyberpunk (Great Britain: Cox & 
Wyman, 2000) p.15. 
^ One might invert this merger and read it as cyberpunk's embrace of hard science and cutting-edge 
information technologies, rather than inscribing the punk onto the cyber. 
® In Sabine Heuser, Virtual Geographies: Cyberpunk at the Intersection of the Postmodern and Science 
Fiction (New York; Rodopi, 2003) pp.5-9. Heuser believes that the truly innovative aspect of cyberpunk is 
its style. Interestingly, in light of the innumerable instances of punk cultural cooption and cyberpunk 
appropriation-tumed-formulaic-imitation, stylistic elements have been forced to imdergo rapid reshaping, if 
for no other reason than terminal self-preservation. Heuser may be right that style makes cyberpunk unique 
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and productive, however, the philosophical traditions of the literature seem to be the force most resistant to 
mass re-packaging. 
^ In Postmodernism, Jameson solidifies his diagnosis of traumatic loss of historical depth by noting 
postmodemism's adherence to a productive loop of Platonic (and eventually Baudrillardian) "simulacrum." 
The condition is a perpetual production of copies without a correlating original. One may think of a CD, an 
encoded artifact that cannot be productively linked with its ephemeral "original" musical performance. In 
the age of CD burners and MP3 files, copies are replications of other copies that are disconnected from any 
source. 
® In Adam Roberts, Fredric Jameson (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 124. 
' In Naomi Klein, No Logo (New York: Picador, 2000) p. 163. 
The conception date(s) for 'cyberpunk' are by no means hard and fast. Bethke's story is indisputably the 
first to use the genre term (and it obviously has had lasting effect), however, the themes explored in the 
fiction have appeared in earlier texts. Among them, the human/computer interface and a possibility of 
digitized identity was a major component of John Brurmer's The Shockwave Rider (1975). Similarly, 
stories by James Tiptree ("The Girl Who Was Plugged In" 1973) and Alfi-ed Bester ("Fondly Fahrenheit" 
1954) have proved touchstones for much of the 1980s cyberpunk. These aforementioned stories appeared in 
Pat Cadigan's anthology The Ultimate Cyberpunk (New York: ibooks, 2002). Many of these 'early' 
cyberpunk stories were influenced by the actual scientific research produced in the Turing Tests of 1950. 
Nonetheless, 'cyberpunk' as a genre took off to critical and commercial acclaim in the mid 1980s, and thus, 
it is important to recognize its relative 'birth' (if not its zenith) during the Reagan era. 
" A useful, though crude, example of artifact re-use comes in the form of safety pins or metal studs 
adorned to clothing. Here, the intended use of household goods has been redirected, resulting in a 
(appropriately punk) disruptive expression of subjectivity. The tools of domesticity that are loaded with 
gender normative ideologies have been dispersed into a new context that rocks the stability of their social 
uniformity. 
Lyotard, for example, has referred to the post-modem age as the 'computerization of society'. 
Hayles' work on posthuman subjectivity is discussed in greater length in chapter 2, however it is worth 
mentioning at this time that I have built some of my cyberpunk ontological concepts off of her theories, 
taking them in new directions. Nonetheless, I believe her book remains the finest on subjectivity in a virtual 
age. In N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
In Daniel Cohen, Our Modern Times: The New Nature of Capitalism in the Information Age, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003) p. 14. 
Ironically, Gibson did not own a computer when he wrote his book, nor was he well versed in recent 
computer science developments. 
In William Gibson Neuromancer, (New York: Ace Books, 1984) p.5. 
In Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash, (New York: Bantam/Spectra, 1992). 
The inclusion of Stephenson's text is not meant to laud the Metaverse scenario as an unimpeachable 
cyberpimk response to corporate rule. In fact, the Metaverse devolves by the end of Stephenson's novel to 
become, in a less egregious way thjin reality, another branded space rife with goverrmiental and capitalist 
intrusion. In certain ways, the Metaverse, and Snow Crash as a project, is evidence of some of the failed 
idealism that cyberpunk pushed in its early stages. However, the example of the Metaverse does reinforce a 
philosophy in cyberpunk that posited bodily escapism into a virtual landscape as the answer to postmodern 
malaise. 
" In Jack Dann & Gardner Dozois, ed. Beyond Flesh, (New York: Ace Books, 2002), p.X. 
Roy Porter conceptualizes the Cartesian philosophy as "I am thinking, therefore I am." Porter recognizes 
the Cartesian privileging of the human mind over the body (and inherently separate from) as a quest for 
certainty: "my own consciousness is the thing of which I can be sure, the sole Archimedean point in the 
human universe. Neither God nor nature, but the go or consciousness is the spring of human self-
understanding." In Roy Porter, Flesh in the Age of Reason-. The Modern Foundations of Body and Soul, 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2003), p.7. 
This emergence can be fi-amed from 1995 to the present. 
Heuser believes the "short-lived hybrid" appeared in the early 1980s and burned out by the early '90s (6). 
Any remnants are something altogether different, essentially pretenders to the throne. Butler, on the other 
hand, sees cyberpunk's fatality as occurring in 1986, if not sooner (16). However, he does recognize that 
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cyberpunk themes have persisted into the '90s and early 2V^ century. This reluctance to give up the ghost, 
though, results in what Butler calls "the new cyberpimk," categorical "cyberpunk-flavoured fiction" (57). 
These works are without the punk styles or reliance upon computers for liberation, making it difficult for 
me to even justify the linkage with cyberpunk. Nonetheless, Butler unfortunately doesn't elaborate his 
useful overview with musings on the philosophies of this "new" cyberpunk. 
In K.W. Jeter, Noir, (New York: Bantam/Spectra, 1998). 
Amazingly, the resurrection of 'fi^ee' internet linkage may lie in the recent upsurge of 'wireless internet' 
locales at cafes or libraries. The vi'ireless hardware technology is yoimg and therefore still relatively 
expensive, however the service is gratis in most cases. 
In Vincent Mosco, The Digital Sublime: Myth, Power, and Cyberspace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 
p.52. 
See Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, p.2. 
See Hesuer, Virtual Geographies, p.7. 
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Chapter 2 
"Resleeving" the Body in Cyberpunk: 
Altered Carbon's Return to the Corporeal 
Early cyberpunk artists loved to reflect. They encouraged U.S. and British 
societies of the 1980s and 1990s to examine their existence in the gleaming surfaces of 
the cyberpunk's mirrored sunglasses. As Bruce Sterling writes in his landmark 
introduction to the Mirrorshades anthology, "Cyberpunk is a product of the Eighties 
milieu . a definitive product. [and] mirrored sunglasses have been a movement 
totem since the early days of '82" (x-xi). The world around the cyberpunk could see their 
gruesome and wonderful reality cast in the mirrors, along with a representation of 
personal identity. Those who donned the mirrorshades were walking opportunities for 
self-examination, that is for everyone but the wearer. Seldom in Sterling's anthology does 
the individual turn the glasses on her/himself and contemplate their own positionality and 
the consequences of the resounding philosophy of disarticulation of identity from the 
body. Conceptualized liberation from the organic human form was a necessary 
compensation for the world scrolling by on glass lenses. 
Afloat amidst waves of literary study concerned with the body's influence on 
subjectivity, cyberpunk authors embraced burgeoning trends of cybernetics- specifically 
how computer-generated and controlled information created a new reality- that humans 
could use as a highway for escape from embodiment. Rather than tackle how corporeality 
constituted identity, the cyberpunks saw the flesh as a prison of humanity and adopted 
Gibson's theory of transcendence into cyberspace as the remedy for the fettered, 
contemptible existence 
For the cyberpunks, identity was forged in the mind and manifested as 
information that, if freed of the flesh, could rearticulate itself in ways only dreamed of in 
reality. Thus, new conditions were imagined that interfaced computers and humans. The 
jacked-in user, through sockets behind the eyes or the neck, was capable of redefining 
himself in cyberspace, as a digital reflection of imagination. As opposed to the trammels 
of the organic body, cyber identity is boundless. Simultaneously, the demarcation of man 
and machine became indistinguishable, as the interface between human and computer 
was purportedly seamless. Li effect, humans became posthuman. Given that the 
cyberpunk literature of the '80s and '90s privileged the informational patterning of 
consciousness over material instantiation, the body was relegated to a role of prosthesis 
that served to facilitate human congruence with the computer, acting as a sort of layover 
site that was serviceable only until a full exodus into cyberspace could be achieved. In 
early and mid wave cyberpunk, the body did not greatly impact subjectivity. Cyberpunks 
turned away from the liberal humanist model that championed possessive individualism, 
autonomy of society, and individuality secured because the subjects owned themselves. 
Instead, they postulated that identity was not owned, but a byproduct of disparate 
heterogeneous influences at work on the individual. Moreover, these influences were 
under the direct confrol of corporations or governmental cadres that sought to brand and 
regulate the body. As Katherine Hayles points out, the human being is a "set of 
informational processes." In articulating this claim, Hayles defines cyberpunk notion of 
subjectivity, which consists of a variety of informational inputs from multiple sources, 
convergent at one point - the human being - though not in synch with one another, in 
order to determine the subjects place in the world. These processes flow and ebb from the 
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psyche, the family, the television, advertisements, communal dialogue. They are 
inscriptive factors that arrive in the form of informational entities, immaterial and 
ephemeral. This concept is important in cyberpunk, not only because it delegitimates 
material conditions, but because it reinforces the hierarchy of informational humanity 
over material humanity. Cyberpunk fiction effectively erased agency as it is tied to the 
human form, claiming that the only vehicle of humanity that could not be corrupted was 
the virtual self, capable of instantaneous reconstruction in cyberspace. 
To say this alleged need to escape the body troubles me would be a vast 
understatement. I undertook an examination of cyberpunk out of fear that the early 
philosophies of the genre had entrenched themselves not only in our vernacular, but in 
our notions of ontological reality. Can human identity really escape the body without 
consequence? I was dissatisfied with the philosophies of the cyberpunk artists of the '80s 
and '90s who believed both that consciousness could ultimately be free of the corporeal 
and that subjectivity's vital element lay in the informational mind. Yet, in the course of 
reading further, I recognized an epistemic shift in the cyberpunk of the past ten years 
(1995-2005) that deconstructed the philosophies that dominated the genre in its early 
years (1975-1994). Other scholars have dubiously referred to this new wave as post-
cyberpunk, though little has been written about what exactly has changed in the art form. 
Most are merely concerned with the determined writers who cling to a genre that 
purportedly died by 1986 and hence, assign a new label in hopes of rekindling interest. 
The purpose of this chapter is an examination of a text written by a leading member of 
post-cyberpunk, Richard Morgan's Altered Carbon (2002), in order to reopen and 
reperiodize cyberpunk's generic history. Morgan's novel heralds a teleological return to 
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the body in cyberpunk that moves away from theorization of the flesh as a prison. Altered 
Carbon works against cyberpunk traditions by reinvesting the human body with the 
potential for agency and, more importantly, by recasting Posthuman subjectivity as an 
ontology predicated upon corporeality. 
To elucidate the contributions Altered Carbon makes in constructing a new 
cyberpunk posthumanity, it is useful to understand how Morgan grapples with the 
bedrock tenets of his predecessors. First, contrary to the earlier cyberpunk idealism that 
figured cyberspace as an egalitarian Utopia free of corporate appropriation and 
governmental oppression, Morgan's cyberspace (called "virtuality" in Altered Carbon) is 
a purgatory that offers no significant change in environment over the stifling sprawl of 
the city. The cyberpunk authors of the 1980s offered hopeful prognostications of the 
internet's potential when the technology was still in its infancy, replete with optimism 
that cyberspace could bridge communities in the exchange of information free of 
governmental monitor. However, the sheen of newfound technology has wom off for 
Morgan. The neo-liberalist' projects spawned from the Reagan era have been torn down 
in Morgan 's fiction, and his writing is undoubtedly influenced by the current state of the 
world web as a virtual playground for corporate commodification and sponsorship, and 
more alarmingly, government surveillance. One can return to the 2003 al-Hussayen civil 
liberties and webmaster trial as evidence of regulatory constriction on the internet and the 
separation from the initial idealism of some supporting parties. No doubt the surveillance 
of cyberspace by government has influenced contemporary cyberpunk authors, arguably 
giving them pause in perpetuating the anointment of the internet as the bastion of 
subversive resistance. 
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Secondly, the perpetual theme in cyberpunk of bodily escapism is contested by 
Morgan. In casting the body as "meat" and as an essentially useless vehicle, Gibson and 
his ilk overlook its importance. If the organic form that houses the consciousness is 
imperiled, the crucial human/computer interface is put in jeopardy. Though it may be 
confining, the body is a nonetheless crucial element in maintaining connection to a virtual 
world. Further, Gibson, Sterling, and Brunner's exploration of body augmentations 
through cybernetic implants indicates a subtext of interest in expanding the corporeal 
possibilities of the Posthuman. Though the interface of man and computer is prevalent in 
Posthuman narratives, complete liberation of the body into digitized form is a suspect 
transgression of intelligible subjectivity. In Morgan's work, shedding of the flesh 
ruptures humanity. Complete transference of consciousness to cyberspace infringes upon 
dangerous universalizing that elides the significance of race and sex in constituting 
identity. For Morgan and others exploring somatic trends in post-cyberpunk, positing 
subversiveness in a forum absent of materiality is fraught with shortcomings. Instead, the 
body is the form that resistance takes. 
Morgan articulates a new Posthuman subjectivity in his novel through a 
technology appropriately called "altered carbon." Morgan's narrative takes place in a 
twenty-fifth century where humans are fitted with cortical stacks at the base of the brain 
that store a person's consciousness. The technology condenses and loads an individual's 
cognitive history into the storage unit so that in the event of death, the "stack" needs 
merely to be retrieved and the consciousness downloaded into a new body or "sleeve." 
The implication of Morgan's future is an existence that is no longer governed by the 
finality of death, as the reloading of consciousness into a new "sleeve" is as 
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commonplace as changing wardrobes. Identity in Altered Carbon is considered, in part, 
what is downloadable and transferable, capable of fluidly occupying one body and then 
another. However, organic death or loss does tremor identity. As opposed to previous 
trends in cyberpunk that sought exodus from the constraints of human flesh altogether, 
consciousness in this text finds its ultimate flexibility and destination within the 
previously abhorrent body/real world. Being downloaded into a body forces the 
individual to assimilate their newfound flesh, and all of its sexual, racial, and cultural 
implications. Here, individuality is contextual rather than universalized for the liberal 
humanist or fractured for the Posthuman. 
The consciousness is synthesized with the body in Altered Carbon, positing 
identity as "embodiment" or, as Katherine Hayles has brilliantly articulated, "embodied 
virtuality." Embodied virtuality compounds two crucial elements of the Posthuman. hi 
previous cyberpunk conceptions, the union of computer and human was exacted through 
an interface of the two, with the virtual component given greater value over the organic. 
Yet Morgan has rearticulated the Posthuman by embedding the virtual component within 
the body. The repository of human identity, the "stack", allows for a virtual existence by 
digitizing the unquantifiable consciousness, making the final step towards allowing the 
user to pour "himself'herself' into the virtual system. The entrenchment of consciousness 
housing within the body, despite its virtual destination, instantiates or gives a tangible 
reality to the ephemeral identity that wafts through virtuality, yearning to be free. Thus, 
no matter how thoroughly the self immerses into the virtual space, it is embodied by its 
fleshly context. Embodiment is a totality. Morgan has envisioned technology matching 
the mutability of the body with the mutability of virtuality because the human subject can 
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never escape the body while retaining the signified humanness that defines us. 
Consequently, virtuality exists on the plane of the computational system, but also exists 
as embodied within corporeality's limits. 
I want to move beyond Hayles' concept of embodied virtuality, however, by 
defining the shift in cyberpunk as a coalescence of Posthuman and liberal humanist 
ontologies. The result is what I define asposthumanist subjectivity. The posthumanist 
agent in cyberpunk is an amalgam, a collision between the blended organic/computer 
Posthuman, and the liberal humanist concept that an individual is proprietor of the self 
Social agency for the posthumanist subject is created by an ability to map consciousness 
onto a cyberspace environment or upload consciousness into a different human organism, 
creating in both scenarios a reconstructed subjectivity in the hands of the individual. We 
have arrived at a new cyberpunk discourse that does not function under the pretense of 
material erasure, but instead acknowledges that identity shifts when the body is erased. 
Unlike previous cyberpunk explorations of the Posthuman that saw the body as a 
normative assumption relative to a particular kind of social and discursive practice, 
Morgan's cyberpunk subjectivity focuses on embodiment that is an incorporation of 
cultural signifiers, physiological traits, and technological augmentations. Posthumanist 
subjectivity is individually articulated through the created network of corporeality and 
consciousness. 
To illustrate this new subjectivity more clearly, I will turn to the text of Altered 
Carbon in more detail. The novel begins with former U.N envoy Takeshi Kovacs 
awaking in the decanting tank he has just been resleeved in. Kovacs deadpans "Coming 
back from the dead can be rough." In sardonic fashion, Morgan introduces the reader to 
resurrection themes in his work. In a metonymic fashion, the resurrection indicates a 
Lazarus-like rise of the supposedly dead cyberpunk genre. The bastard literature has 
returned, but in a new form. As Morgan outlines humanity's existence in a virtual realm 
after the body expires, a reader within the cyberpunk genre might ostensibly believe that 
virtual immortality, or "storage" as it is called in the text, would be the oft dreamed-of 
destination where agency was finally granted to the individual consciousness. However, 
we become aware that this is a new type of cyberpunk when the narrating Kovacs 
declares that virtuality presents a new fear, one greater than reality, where "you had no 
control, and literally anything could happen" (138). 
Virtuality in Altered Carbon is a tool that can be used for interrogation or data 
relay. Yet, in most cases, the inhabitants of virtuality who are absent of body, drift in 
storage as if it were limbo. The cyberspace-equivalent does not satisfy with a projection 
of subjectivity onto a limitless space that grants the user flexible articulations of the self 
Instead, it shatters subjectivity leaving the individual a shell of their jettisoned humanity. 
Morgan emphasizes that virtuality is a deplorable alternative to corporeal reality through 
the depiction of his characters' incessant desire to avoid time in storage and to remain 
embodied. At one point, the detective investigating the murder case central to the novel's 
narrative tells Kovacs that even wealthy connections "will not keep you organic forever" 
(155). The tacit threat of organic death and subsequent virtual life implies that lack of a 
human "sleeve" means a disengagement from the world and the ultimate punitive fate. 
Later in the novel, Kovacs says in a discussion over the trappings of virtuality that 
"Most virtual systems recreate you from self-images held in the memory, with a 
commonsense subroutine to prevent your delusions from impinging too much.. .but most 
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of us grow rapidly attached to whatever sleeve we're living in, and that form blanks out 
previous incarnations. We are, after all, evolved to relate to the physical world" (159). 
Morgan is highly aware of the consequences of a virtual self The attachment to the 
human form is not dismissed as trivial, but an influence on how human's project 
themselves onto virtuality. If anything, the failed initial projects of cyberpunk are 
mourned. Kovacs' statements regarding attachment to physicality are met with a 
quintessential post-cyberpunk lament from his enemy: "Where is the voice that said 
altered carbon would free us from the cells of our flesh?" (160). Also, Kovacs' 
sentiments are evidence of a more significant conception of the body's role in 
subjectivity. When consciousness is transferred into a new body, human subjectivity is 
rethought. The new body creates a new self. This is a major detour from the earlier 
cyberpunk authors who claimed that subjectivity was reducible to informational patterns 
in the mind, and that the body was "meat" or a prosthesis that could be left in the comer. 
In the Posthuman age, Morgan explores an ontology that thinks about the body 
not as a separate entity, like one would a hitchhiker, but as a defining costume that 
dictates who we are. At a tantalizingly loaded juncture in the text, Kovacs finds himself 
displaced from his acquainted sleeve, and embodied within a young woman's form. 
Kovacs transitions the reader into a new subjectivity by explaining that "a digitized mind 
is only a snapshot" (119). The experience in the female body creates a new Kovacs, 
complete with new theories about the implications of cross-sleeving. Kovacs says "to be 
a woman was a sensory experience beyond the male." Through his self-described cross-
sleeving, Kovacs experiences a new cognition. This is not to imply that femaleness is 
only the body, and that Kovacs' predominantly male experiences inscribed in his 
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consciousness can be overcome simply by placing him in a woman's flesh. Instead, the 
corporeal sensations of the female human form impact identity in a much more 
significant fashion than earlier cyberpunk novels prognosticated. To borrow from Judith 
Butler, the body matters. 
At the moment when Kovacs is returned to the male sleeve that he wears for the 
majority of the novel, the narration presents an amazingly nuanced syntax, hidden within 
simplicity. The narrator Kovacs utters a final "I was" before the sentence ruptures 
without punctuation, only to finish one line below with "Not" (124). The pronoun "I" 
signifies a subjectivity that includes the female body worn by Kovacs. This subjectivity 
becomes altered as Kovacs loses consciousness and is resleeved in the prior body. The 
"I" ceases to be when a new body is inhabited, reconstructed as a different Kovacs, 
reinforcing Morgan's exploration of the impact of corporeality upon subjectivity. 
Similarly, when Kovacs is confronted by a woman he killed a few days prior, now 
resleeved in a drastically different-looking body, she is surprisingly calm, telling him 
"The me you torched in that cruiser, she's dead. That wasn't me. So, no hard feelings" 
(219). Kovacs acquiesces and later regurgitates the protean quality of altered carbon in 
the form of a platitude. "No matter how much you might know intellectually that you'll 
be resleeved with the bulk of your mind intact, the person you are at that moment is going 
to die" (281). 
One may be tempted to ask at this point why the new direction of cyberpunk must 
be discussed as distinct from the antecedent genre works, especially considering that 
'early' cyberpunk explored a conjunction of cybernetic technology with humans similar 
to that of Morgan's cortical stacks, only it was discussed in terms of the 'cyborg' figure. 
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Keeping in mind the explanation I gave in the introduction for not discussing these 
ontological shifts in terms of cyborg studies (of the sort that Harraway or Yaszek 
participate in), we can look at the logic of Altered Carbon for the differentiating 
rationale. When Kovacs is greeted by a steel-faced receptionist at the Bancroft estate, he 
identifies the being as a "mandroid" (100). The discourse of the novel identifies this 
entity as a machine/human hybrid, but Kovacs does not address it as a fellow human. 
Machine components in human shape do not signify humanity, as the being has passed 
beyond human intelligibility into a new distinction. Further, the machined cortical stack 
technology embedded in the flesh does not qualify people as cyborgs (or "mandroids," 
for that matter). They are referred to as humans. Morgan's use of resleeving technology 
in the text pushes human beings into the realm of posthumanity by seamlessly interfacing 
computational technology and corporeality. However, it does not transform the individual 
into a cyborg, which would signal a disavowal of humanness. For Morgan, the digitizable 
consciousness that enables reconstruction of the subject is an expansion of corporeal 
capability — an augmentation of humanity. Kovacs edifies this distinction when he notes 
that "most jobs that require a human form are better done by those organic alternatives" 
(101). He goes on to claim that the "truth is that a robot human is a pointless collision of 
two disparate functions." He doesn't view his existence as partially robotic and the 
longevity of his humanity is, in part, secured by his continued use of the resleeving 
technology. 
The resleeving process in Altered Carbon presents a new sort of economy of the 
flesh. As was earlier discussed, agency and choice for the Posthuman were erased 
because the self that existed in reality was a product of market forces colliding without 
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much concert or control. Morgan attempts to rewrite this trend in his novel. Kovacs 
examines his own subjectivity at one point in that tireless trope of gazing into the mirror. 
He muses on "the self I'd built somewhere in the coils of memory that trail all the way 
back to childhood" (180). Literestingly, Kovacs refers to the self as a built product. 
Rather than being subjected to the onslaught of corporate and/or governmental messages 
that regulate identity for the cyberpunks of the past, Kovacs essentially owns himself and 
is able to "build" subjectivity in the mind, similar to the function imagined for cyberspace 
escapism in its inception. The built-self coupled with the capability of literally purchasing 
one's body, results in an existence imbued with agency to change his or her subjectivity, 
rather than have that subjectivity dictated completely by outside influences. The synthesis 
of the virtual field of consciousness coupled with a newfound respect for the flesh 
culminates in a new cyberpunk that is defined as posthumanist. Agents in cyberpunk have 
relocated their site of non-conformity into an organic merger of information and material. 
The artistry involved with Morgan's built-self process is less of an abstraction 
formed in Enlightenment possessive individualism, and a more tangible rearticulation of 
the human body. Kovacs summarizes this notion in a conversation about the rigors of his 
Envoy duties; "That's what an Envoy is, Curtis. A reassembled human. An artifice" 
(186). In the logic of Morgan's text, the body and humanity are artifice, the subject is the 
artificer. The subject, in this case Kovacs, imagines and constructs the body through 
technological capabilities (resleeving), inhabiting and shaping a new human form to suit 
his evolving needs, and breaking fi-om postmodern anxieties over cultural emptiness and 
absence of autonomy. This moment is emblematic of the move in contemporary 
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cyberpunk towards a new ontology of self-determination in an age when humanity is 
considered depleted beyond recognition: the posthumanist artificer. 
The posthumanist artificer is a subject of radical autonomy. Humanism has long 
been centered on a self-determinism that could trump social forces, allowing the 
individual to negotiate a spatial and historical position in even the most frenzied, 
alienating markets. Postmodernism's collapse of the unified subject due to a dominance 
of capitalist media messaging results in heteronomy of the self Autonomy appeared to be 
impossible in the face(s) of fracturing conditions. Humanity in postmodernism is 
multiplicity. However, by embracing the elastic potential of multiplicity, the 
posthumanist can stage a writing and rewriting of embodied identity that is necessary for 
understanding one's (changing) place in society, and determining agency. The human 
becomes as protean as the world around him. 
If we think of the human body and consciousness as a micro-network and the 
subject as the operator, then we begin to understand how the posthumanist artificer is a 
new ontology, formed on the principals of dominant information age rationality. The 
posthumanist artificer is an open system humanity: the subject has access to all of the 
immediate parts that constitute subjectivity and is able to author the revision of those 
parts. 
Perhaps the most revolutionary ontological move that Morgan's posthumanist 
cyberpunk philosophy makes is a counter to the bedrock reductions that everywhere 
circle foundational cyberpunk art. When Kovacs confronts an avid opponent of continual 
resleeving, he seems also to address the entire genre of cyberpunk that came before. "I 
dropped my gaze into my lap and let out a sigh that was only partially manufactured. 
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Then I took off my own sunglasses and looked up at her. It was all there on plain display. 
The naked fear of resleeving and all that it entailed; paranoid essentialism with its back to 
the wall" (164) Here, emotion is not all simulacra or produced by culture, but is 
genuinely personal. The mirrorshades have come off, and Kovacs takes an honest look at 
humanity, no longer hiding behind a listless costume trope. He is aware of the new 
Posthuman. The essentialism jeopardized by resleeving is a claim that physicality is all 
that constitutes identity. Equally threatened is the belief that the digitized mind is the lone 
site of humanity. The polarized essentialisms have been backed against a wall for 
execution, eradicated in favor of a subjectivity that embeds that limitless consciousness 
within the versatile form of the human body. 
' By neo-liberalism, I mean the political and economic policies that advocate deregulation, market rule, the 
reduced role of government, and privatization. 
^ Katherine Hayles has written the best book I have encountered on the restoration of liberal humanism in 
conjunction with the posthuman, How We Became Posthuman (1999). She writes, "I see the deconstruction 
of the liberal humanist subject as an opportunity to put back into the picture the flesh that continues to be 
erased in contemporary discussions about cybernetic subjects" (5). Hayles does a marvelous job 
articulating how instantiation of informational and cognitive patterns (in a material form) begins to revise 
the liberationist fantasies of cybernetic research and literatures exploring the subject. However, Hayles does 
not discuss, in a prolonged or specific sense, the particular human form as a participant in this new 
ontology. I am attempting to pick up the discussion in such a way that theorizes the flexibility of 
corporeality, specifically those trends explored in contemporary cyberpunk novels. However, Hayles and I 
share a commitment to reinstating a modicum of agency in the posthuman through an application of 
information technology. 
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Chapter 3 
Clothing Lost Souls: 
Reuniting Body and Mind in Tea from an Empty Cup 
Pat Cadigan's Tea from an Empty Cup' is a textual search party. The narrative 
revolves around two different investigations into the disappearance of a single person. 
Paralleling these investigations is a philosophical search that Cadigan herself undertakes 
for signifiers that have gone missing from cyberpimk notions of identity. Specifically, the 
text involves a search for a synchronous relationship between the physical body and 
virtual reality, and also a search for the role of national identity in a global-systems 
world. 
The novel begins with the discovery of a slain body in an Artificial Reality (AR) 
booth. Lt. Dore Konstantin is assigned the investigation of Tomoyuki Iguchi's death. 
Konstantin is fascinated by the case, in part because it fits a pattern of recent murders in 
which the online persona of the AR user (the avatar) is killed, followed by the proxy 
'real' death of the user in reality, hi this instance, Tomoyuki Iguchi's avatar, Shantih 
Love, has her throat slashed in AR. In reality, Iguchi dies a similar death. Konstantin is 
baffled by the scenario after viewing a surveillance tape of the AR booth that shows no 
one enter after Iguchi. The mortal wound appears to have been administered in the online 
realm. Konstantin must immerse herself in the AR forum that Iguchi was using at the 
time of his death in order to pursue her investigation. However, Konstantin is a novice at 
AR navigation, and the online scenario of Post-Apocalyptic Noo Yawk Sitty puts her on 
unfamiliar (and newly dangerous) turf. Konstantin is advised to seek out Body Sativa, the 
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pseudo-deity of online omnipotence who can answer any question about AR existence 
and explain the dangerous trend of concomitant real world/AR deaths. 
Occurring simultaneously to Konstantin's embarking on her cyberspace journey is 
Yuki's search. Concerned about the circumstances of her friend Tomoyuki Iguchi's 
death, the young Asian woman, Yuki, examines the final days of Iguchi's (or "Tom's") 
life. She seeks the counsel of the pimp Joy Flower, owner of a brothel that specializes in 
boys surgically altered to pass as Japanese. Joy hires Yuki as an office attendant in trade 
for the latter's use of an AR "hotsuit" which belongs to a brothel. The suit allows Yuki to 
interface with the virtual realm and experience sensory, visceral reactions to the events 
that take place while she is in AR. Unbeknownst to Yuki, Joy has supplied the hotsuit in 
order to involve the young woman in a tawdry fantasy game of projection. Clients of the 
brothel pay to "ride" Yuki while she is immersed in AR, taking control of her body and 
evicting Yuki from corporeal ownership. When she first becomes aware of this 
surreptitious hijacking, Yuki struggles to understand the violation that takes place. "Her 
hand moved on its own, but she refused to open her eyes . . [i]t felt as if someone was 
wearing her hand as a glove- Panic exploded inside her. Her eyes snapped open and she 
jumped out of the chair . . trying to catch someone molesting her" (141).Yuki's search 
for Tom in AR transplants her consciousness and creates a lag in awareness of the body, 
and as a result, she is slow to recognize and ultimately defend her flesh from intrusion, hi 
this scene of virtual rape and in the novel as a whole, Cadigan begins to rework the early 
cyberpunk trope of escape from the flesh through the cyberspace causeway. Instead, 
Cadigan depicts the relationship of corporeality to virtual consciousness as an estranged, 
yet far from disconnected, coexistence. 
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In the course of her own investigation, Yuki comes to realize the subtle link 
between physical and virtual identities and begins to come to terms with her own national 
identity. The inauthenticity of Joy Flower's "Japanese" prostitutes (called "Joy Boys") 
establishes Cadigan's concern with the determination and commodification of national 
identity. Cyberpunk's longstanding play with the breakdown of nationalisms and nation-
states thanks to trans-national corporate takeover is crucial to Cadigan's text. However, in 
juxtaposition to other cyberpunk authors, Cadigan does not revel in her textual world's 
lack of national identity, but sends Yuki on a journey to rediscover her Japanese 
nationhood: a voyage that will transform ontological and physical significations of her 
body. Through the search for explanation of Tom's murder, Yuki examines her own 
subjectivity in the AR space, and retums to reality after rediscovering forgotten Japanese 
history. Yuki incorporates this knowledge into her own body, claiming her form as 
emblematic of Japan by acting out tea and dance rituals that celebrate the physicality of 
the national body. She attempts a deconstruction of the degraded fetishization of Japanese 
identity that is artificially pantomimed in Joy Flower's brothel. 
Central to Cadigan's novel are discussions of virtual reality's impact on 
embodiment (carried out in Konstantin's story) and embodied national identity (corporeal 
personhood representing the nation) in a context that privileges nation-less virtual selves 
(addressed in Yuki's thread). In both cases, Cadigan's post-cyberpunk elevates 
embodiment to the ontology. Cadigan shows the co-dependent relationship of the body 
and avatar by reuniting body and mind. She also reinvests corporeal signifiers of race and 
nationality with immense importance; a philosophical move that subverts the trans­
national erosion of nation-state identity. In doing so, Cadigan's Tea from an Empty Cup 
allows the individual to use the body as a mechanism for the discontinued nation to 
recover. 
The similarity between the recovered body with its physical boundaries and the 
resurrected nation-state with its borders is telling. Cadigan 's critique of cyberspace and 
globalization is that the deregulation symptomatic in both systems has effaced stable 
signifiers of identity and made the individual easily commodified and exploited. The 
response, though not without its shortcomings, is protectionist. By privileging the body 
and d the nation-state, greater control over self-hood and national identity can be 
achieved. The contentious logic of Cadigan's text is that the recovery of the nation-state 
will lead to greater self-reliance and individualism. 
Cadigan's description of artificial reality is a much more nuanced one than most 
cyberpunk insistences that the virtual space is something completely distinct from 
sensorial embodied experience. Yuki recalls how Iguchi used to press her on what 
'reality' consisted of: "O/z, what that supposed to mean anyway, 'artificial reality'? Tom 
used to say to her whenever she used the term. If it's reality, how can it possibly be 
artificial?'' (28). In Tea from an Empty Cup, the organic contact with the computer 
system is an interface in the truest sense of the word. Material and immaterial conjoin 
and dialogue with one another, the reality of each impacting the summation product (AR 
navigation). Unlike the ocular consumption of television, taken in from the distanced 
comfort of the couch and in an immobile position, cyberspace navigation is engaging. 
Cultural and technology critic Steven Shaviro notes that "Television addresses my ears 
and eyes, but the Net solicits my entire body. Web surfing is a tactile, physical 
experience" (6).^ The aesthetic model of Cadigan's AR might be better defined as haptic 
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space, what Deleuze and Guattari call a "pure connection" that occurs at "close range" 
and through "close vision" (493). Haptic space is a two-way flow that is interactive, 
rather than a passive/active relationship. Within a haptic space, the "orientations, 
landmarks, and linkages" of AR are, for the human user, "in continuous variation" (493). 
The shifting of patterns is not seen from a distance, like television, but is interacted with. 
Consequently, the organic component of the interface is affected by the shifts in the 
haptic AR just as the user may affect changes in the AR space. In Tea from an Empty 
Cup, this principle is at work when the ostensible cause of Iguchi's death from the throat 
wound received in cyberspace is mirrored in his embodied reality. Cadigan sees the 
overlap of AR and reality as an opportunity to reconfigure the escapist philosophy of 
cyberspace. 
By thinking about virtual space as an intelligible contributing factor to reality, or 
haptic factor, one can follow the logical step of considering the fallacies of 
disembodiment in virtual space and isolated experience in AR. If events in cyberspace are 
just as viable (in our earthly existence) as those experienced offline, then certainly the 
vehicle of existence in the real (the body) is as important as the form consciousness takes 
in AR. Similarly, if AR is mechanism that manipulates our reality, and hence our 
subjectivity, then corporeality must manipulate virtual experience. Cadigan's use of the 
haptic space and interaction of the tangible with AR results in the body muscling its way 
back into the cyberpunk picture and out of the subordinated position of 'prison'. 
In his introduction to Mark Hansen's New Philosophy for New Media, Tim Lenoir 
spells out the anxieties about material erasure that computational and cybernetic 
ingenuity brought about. He writes, "From the very beginning of critical engagement 
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with computer technology, concern has been voiced about the potential, feared by many, 
celebrated by some, of the end of humanity" (xv)."^ Lenoir writes that new trends in 
virtual spaces and machine/human combination have lead to an unflagging paranoia over 
the extinction of the embodied human. Hansen, in his text, tackles questions of the body's 
importance in the digital, post-photography age. He argues that "media convergence 
under digitality actually increases the centrality of the body as firamer of information: as 
media lose their material specificity, the body takes on a more prominent function as 
selective processor in the creation of images" (xxii). Hansen's articulation, both in its 
theoretical ramification and its relevance to Cadigan's novel, defines a buttressing move 
that is underway, preventing the body from being washed away from ontological 
existence (that is founded on embodiment) under the torrent of digitized data flow. 
Hansen calls for recognition that even an existence inscribed by digital images and 
commands, an existence that is the dominant narrative of tech industry work 
environments, the body still remains the vital mediating device to interpret that 
information. Hansen says "the image can no longer be restricted to the level of surface 
appearance, but must be extended to encompass the entire process by which information 
is made perceivable through embodied experience" (10). This process says as much about 
the fleshly being that codifies information as it does about the informational text itself. 
Like Cadigan's AR users who experience feedback sensations fi^om the computer 
program and ultimately articulate the impact of information with their own bodies, 
Hansen's new media participant enframes digital data turning information flow into a 
subjective experience. By these means of raising the body in level of import, human 
beings can enact some degree of ownership over information and realize that their 
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corporeality is an indelible element of subject existence, no matter how grand or intrusive 
the informational network. 
Cadigan has made statements about the body's importance for subjectivity and an 
artistic need, in the post-cyberpunk age, to reinvest the genre with concem over the flesh. 
In a 1998 online interview for Media in Transition, Cadigan discusses the constant theme 
of human polymorphism in cyberpunk, and the material reality of those idealisms: "One 
of the things about artificial reality or virtual reality is that the idea of the body you have 
becomes less important that your imagination or your ingenuity. It is not that I think we 
will, or that we should, completely abandon our physical lives, it's just that that's not all 
there is to being alive.Cadigan is not a Romanticist yearning to return to pure 
physicality, nor does she partake in the occasional strains of Libertarian cyberpunk 
thinking that sees technology as an inimical burden on humanity. She accepts the 
relevance and actuality of virtual reality systems in our lives, but will not transfer all 
notions of subjectivity (future or present) into artificial space. Cadigan is focused on 
synthesizing material and virtual realities in the figure of the new human who negotiates 
the informational world in modes different than pre-1980s consumerism. 
In addition to marshaling a digital and material synthesized subject in cyberpunk, 
Cadigan's work also attempts to overcome the philosophy du jour of mind superiority. 
Early in Tea, an AR arcade owner becomes involved in an argument with a patron. The 
owner grimaces at the suggestion that carnal satisfaction exists primarily in the fleshly, 
material world, retorting '"Your body's not really out here. Your body's in here.'' He 
leaned forward over the table and tapped his head. 'Your whole body is in here, and 
nowhere else'" (17). Whether he is aware of it or not, the arcade owner plays out a 
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fundamental ontological question of mind/body duality in his response. He portrays the 
mind as the primary port of subjectivity, relegating the body (in traditional cyberpunk 
fashion) to biological happenstance, a prosthesis that is an echo of the self conceived of 
in consciousness. However, the fissure in his argument is the tacit acknowledgment of a 
body. The mind recognizes not just synapses and conscious thought, like that 
transcendent ideal existence mapped onto cyberspace, but also the frame of a body. 
Without question, the shop owner elides the importance of corporeality, believing that 
recovery of the body can easily occur in the mind. Yet, the sublimated acceptance of 
bodily existence begins to hint at a realized embodied subjectivity present in even the 
most obdurate meat-transcendent. 
It is appropriate that Cadigan's messenger of mind superiority is a shop owner. As 
owner of capital means of production (in the text's economic stratum), the man is the 
most understandable champion of material erasure. He has achieved success as proprietor 
of a digital and AR boutique, in part, because of the market conditions that naturalize the 
mind/informational over material hierarchy. As is true in contemporary work places 
where the product is intangible coding and network contribution that cannot be taken 
home at night, the dominant work places of Cadigan's text privilege information 
technology over organic labor. Similar to human labor completed at the computer 
keyboard and screen, laborers in Tea construct digital apparatuses by immersing 
themselves within their machine work stations. Workers are encouraged to forget their 
bodies in favor of the posthuman subjectivity that juxtaposes organic and computer. Over 
time, the subject is fully interpolated into the hierarchy and becomes a digitizable voice 
supportive of that matrix. In a potentially dire way, the individual may come to view 
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him/herself as an insufficient being whose organic contribution to the workplace is only a 
mildly acceptable shortcoming. Thus, by addressing the question of mind superiority over 
body in the rest of the novel, Cadigan also addresses the bourgeois shop owner who 
manufactures the very market conditions where the dualism prospers and the rhetoric of 
bodily erasure. 
Shortly after the diatribe on the body's mental constructedness, the focus of the 
text shifts to the murder scene and Konstantin's first examination of the virmal-come-real 
death. 
DiPietro and Celestine peeled the kid's hotsuit off him for the coroner. It 
was too much like seeing an animal get skinned, only grislier, and not just 
because most of the kid's blood was on the hotsuit. Undemeath, his naked 
flesh was imprinted with a dense pattern of lines and shapes, Byzantine in 
complexity, from the wires and sensors in the suit. (36) 
Cadigan delivers a resounding rebuttal to the beliefs that the mind functioned in AR 
independently of the body, that the flesh was unimportant contributor to subjectivity, and 
that consciousness and corporeality held little sway over one another. In this gruesome 
moment, Tom Iguchi's murdered body is literally branded with the diodes of his AR suit. 
The flash bums of virtual use are mirrored in the flesh. In the most stark and violent 
manner, Cadigan has made it clear that what happens in AR is experienced materially. 
Further, in a symbolic gesture, the hotsuit that is the transport device to digital exodus is 
Temoved, showing that the damage to the flesh stemming from the escape is not minimal 
and clean, like moving from one room to another, but is costly and ghastly. 
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Konstantin and the other detectives at the crime scene try to fit Iguchi's death into 
the pattern of virtual-to-reality slayings. However, they recognize that the feedback 
impact of AR on corporeality is not a trend emerging exclusively with the recent deaths, 
but has always been a palpable consequence of AR use. One investigator cites this, 
saying that AR has ""'always been non-safe, even before it was fatal'" (38). The 
breakdown of non-real and real is a progressive move in post-cyberpunk, and is one that 
forces the reader to reconsider virtual immersion as an alternative to embodiment if the 
two are privy to the same crimes. The canvas of the murder scene closes with Konstantin 
looking from the unhelpful videotape of the AR booth to the body and back again. She 
remarks that the case is one of a "dead kid's false face pretending to be alive in a city 
pretending to be dead" (55). The mobius strip of authenticity and pretender that rattles 
Konstantin proves, as the case and novel unfold, to be truer than she ever imagined. For 
soon we come to learn that Iguchi was cloaking his identity in both AR and in reality by 
attempting to pass as Japanese. Additionally, the online avatar, Shantih Love, that was 
killed by the wound to the throat, triggering Iguchi's real death, has been resurrected and 
is interacting in the virtual world despite system limitations that prevent persona 
duplication. The loop of falsity grows ever wider, while the nuances of AR and the 
material world cinch ever closer. 
Based upon the identification code adhered to Iguchi's body, Konstantin takes 
him for a Japanese man. But the identification system is a palimpsest, with one ID on top 
of another. Detective Mezzer tells Konstantin that Iguchi was "trying to turn Japanese. 
He wanted anyone who stripped his label to find his Japanese name underneath and take 
him for that" (74). When he was alive, Iguchi's attempted Japanese costume was carried 
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out in AR as well. Mezzer notes that Iguchi "was tryin' to be a Japanese guy named 
Shantih Love" in cyberspace (75). The attempt at passing as Japanese in both realms 
leaves the reader and detectives to ponder Iguchi's actual identity and his motivations for 
transforming his ethnicity. 
The reasoning behind Iguchi's passing is explained in the national breakup of 
Japan and the subsequent fetishization of Japanese national and ethnic identities in the 
marketplace. Initially, Yuki was drawn to Iguchi through national camaraderie, she (a 
Japanese woman) believing he was one of the few Japanese citizens who remained on the 
Pacific Rim following the earthquake and mass diaspora. When recounting her attraction 
to Iguchi, Yuki recalls the physical breakup of the islands: "They were both full Japanese, 
if, indeed it was still possible to be Japanese at all when the land itself had been all but 
obliterated" (64). Cadigan's premise of a destroyed national geography is an exaggeration 
of the pejorative effects of globalization that threaten nation-states. Even though the 
culprit in the collapse of the Japanese island chain is a natural disaster, Cadigan creates 
the context to discuss how national identity is compromised when geography is 
transformed. 
Like many other cyberpunk texts. Tea from an Empty Cup paints corporate 
capitalism as a trans-national entity. For the most part, corporate globalization remains on 
the periphery of the novel. Yet, the rampant traversing of boundary lines has destabilized 
ideas of the place and the nation. Yuki muses that she "couldn't imagine the Japan 
[Grandma] Naoka had told her stories of (64). The aggressive global capitalism that 
forces an individual to latch onto an identity, both nationally and within the market, does 
not allow Yuki to retain her Japanese nationhood after the collapse of the islands. She 
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tells Iguchi (in a flashback) that the Japanese diaspora led to a new integration in trans­
national market as people "didn't call Japan the motherland" anymore (67). Thus, without 
the geographical Japan, a central question of the novel becomes how one retains national 
identity without a spatial signifier. Yuki struggles with forming an answer to this issue, 
though she is aware that Japanese nationalism cannot die with the collapse of the islands. 
She says that the land loss "doesn't mean Japan is dead It doesn't mean there isn't a 
Japan somewhere" (67). 
At this juncture, the text poses two possible outcomes of the tenuous Japanese 
national identity, exploitation or recovery. Iguchi's response is exploitative. Capitalism 
responds to the Japanese land breakdown and fracturing of the nation by creating a new 
niche market. Authentic Japanese individuals become commodified in artistic trades and 
cultural movements. The Joy Boys prostitute ring commodifies Japanese culture in the 
flesh trade, seizing upon the opportunity to replicate corporeal Japanese ethnicity for 
profit. Iguchi also works in this vein. Ethnically Caucasian, the duplicitous man. Ash, 
constructs a new identity as Tomoyuki Iguchi. He goes to work for Joy Flower gaining 
the trust of displaced Japanese citizens and eventual access to their finances. The 
implication is that in the absence of geography, recognition of nationhood breaks down 
and inauthentic representations may be more easily passed off. However, a buttressing 
mechanism is in place to protect nationality. Embrace of the body as material signifier of 
nationhood is the second track offered by Cadigan in the face of national erasure. 
Cadigan does not see reconstruction of Japanese national community in AR as 
particularly effective means of recovery. Escapism into cyberspace estranges the self 
from material components of nationhood. When Konstantin nears the completion of her 
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investigation into Iguchi/Ash's virtual death, she reaches the conclusion that AR is a 
"playground for lost souls" (228). Virtual existence only partially inscribes identity, but 
what must be tended to is the physical counterpart to the mind. At a similar point in her 
own investigation, Yuki becomes obsessed with the location of Japanese identity if it is 
not geographically relevant. When she reaches the Body Sativa, observer of AR's 
informational comings and goings, Yuki poses this question: "Am I not Japanese just 
because the physical islands were destroyed?" (219). Complete license to rearticulate 
subjectivity in cyberspace is turned around by this inquiry. The physical loss of the 
islands partly undermines Japanese nationality, speaking to the importance of physical 
models of identity. However, Body Sativa responds with a proposition that exemplifies 
Cadigan's entire project of reuniting body and mind, corporeality and AR, material and 
digital. She says, "'All peoples have a source . We are re-constructing ours, not in soil 
and rock and ocean, but in flesh and blood, nerve and synapse. Can't you feel it?"' (219). 
This is an exciting theorization of ontological authorship posed by Cadigan. Resurrection 
of physical geography is unnecessary for re-constructing the nation. Instead, the recovery 
of Japan takes place on an individual level within the body. 
Graham Murphy accurately captures the significance of Sativa's claim of 
individualized physical nationhood: "Body Sativa initiates a (re)defmition of nation as 
Cadigan removes the geographical terrain as the sole signifier of nationality and 
resituates nation in both mythology and corporeality."^ Murphy recognizes the necessity 
of a new nationhood, especially when the power matrix of Cadigan's text involves 
"corporate enterprise that has seemingly replaced nation as the new constituency." What 
Yuki's introspective search while in AR yields is access to Japanese cultural memory 
called "Old Japan". In AR, Old Japan is an ontology that the user adopts, one that 
Murphy calls "a potential site of convergence for the Japanese diaspora of the novel." 
The lecture on bodily importance Sativa gives triggers Yuki's individuation and 
integration of national belonging. Sativa illuminates the productive effects possible when 
the "lost souls" wandering AR reclaim their bodies. For Yuki, this means considering her 
body as a metonymic signifier of Japan rather than naively hoping for the reappearance of 
the islands. Yuki takes the advice to heart and adopts a new "high-res vision" of her 
body's importance (233). She ceremoniously returns to reality in a dance, now thinking 
of the Japanese heritage that she embodies. "Old Japan raised her arms, lifted her 
gracefully into a dance that her blood knew even though the last time it had been 
performed had been sometime long before most recorded history. There was no record of 
this anywhere; there didn't have to be" (233). The identity that Yuki reclaimed in AR 
returns with her to embodied reality where she transforms the boundaries of her flesh into 
a record of Japan, standing in for nonexistent borders and geography. Further, Yuki's 
struggle to remember Japan and keep the national identity alive mentally is what critics of 
globalization, such as John Ralston Saul, see as the fallout of corporate trans-nationalism. 
Cadigan counters the mass-produced amnesia of globalization by positing cultural 
stewardship in utilization of the body as a national marker. 
Yuki's ascension through corporeally Japanese subjectivity is set in direct 
opposition to Ash/Iguchi's fatal quest for Old Japan. Yuki is allowed full access to the 
virtually-located Old Japan, or the 'website' the houses cultural history/identity, because 
she is full-blooded Japanese (218). Her fleshly existence matters and determines her 
subjectivity, even in AR. Ash/Iguchi was denied access because his genetic material was 
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not compatible with the cultural legacy of Japan. His attempt to pass as Japanese was an 
affront to the online realm, and the murder of his avatar is in direct response to his 
transgression. 
Cadigan treads on dangerous ground with her concept of racial purity that grants 
access to a reclaimed and ascendant national selfhood. Murphy points out that "the idea 
of a 100% genetically 'pure' ethnic subject is increasingly unlikely due to transnational 
border movements of peoples across borders and the resultant genetic hybridity." Only 
within Cadigan's precise formulation of the status of national identity and the nation state 
does the construct of recovery as opened to 'native sons and daughters' have some ethical 
merit. However, the construct is still problematic given Benedict Anderson's articulation 
of national identities predicated on "imagined communities."^ Anderson recognizes the 
fluctuated though still potent role that "nation-ness" plays in global systems. He claims 
that nationalism is a modular concept deployable through ideological and technological 
avenues. All communities, Anderson notes, are imagined; therefore, projects like those of 
Cadigan's characters, centered on restoring an amorphous abstraction of the sovereign 
state through racially-material means, seem disingenuous and doomed to disappointment. 
Cadigan moves around this problem through motivational factors. She retreats 
from strict (racially-driven) materialism to the imaginative tact that places constitution of 
the nation in the imaginations of the citizens. Yuki's noble plan to resurrect Japan relies 
on one of Anderson's core claims that intentionality inscribes nationality. He writes: 
"Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in 
which they are imagined" (6). Unlike Joy Flower, who wishes to gain access to Old Japan 
information in order to create more "authentic" and effectively-altered "Japanese" male 
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prostitutes, or Ash, whose exploitative designs have been covered, Yuki desires entry into 
Old Japan for restorative purposes. She is not utilizing Japanese nationalism or ethnicity 
to participate in vile market economics, but is trying to patch together her fractured 
identity through the galvanizing forces of nation. Nonetheless, Cadigan's philosophy that 
the body impacts nationality suffers from an essentialism that seems difficult to 
circumvent. Is a hybrid individual foreclosed from entrance into online cultural archives 
like Old Japan? Is ontology hypostatized at a genetic level, such that one can never move 
beyond ethnicity? Is bolstering of the nation-state a task only for one ethnically-specific 
citizen? Such questions are fissures in Cadigan's subject emancipation theories, but they 
do not throw out entirely the important statements made about the relevancy of 
embodiment for the information-age consumer. 
Cadigan closes Tea from an Empty Cup with a scene that is both viscerally base 
and ceremonially elegant. Yuki awakens from her difficult journey in AR and discovery 
of Ash's treachery to a sparse room. She had passed out, exhausted, after declaring that 
""Japan livesV but now finds herself rejuvenated (251). Yuki is presented with a cup of 
green tea that smells strongly. The taste grows more potent as she drinks. Part of an 
ancient Japanese custom, Yuki is participating in Bunraku (218). Murphy tells us that this 
ceremony is a mythologized "rebirth" that promises a fransformation of the subject; "The 
myth of a new Old Japan comes full circle in this bunraku . . [a]s the newly enlightened 
. . Yuki banishes her culture-less Susanowo [or, exiled Sea god] personality, divorcing 
herself from her previous life as the impetuous and shallow . person trapped by the 
superficial eye-candy of AR" (154, bracketed additions mine). While most certainly 
recognizable as a return of Japanese nationhood within Yuki, Cadigan also drives home 
78 
post-cyberpunk's involvement of corporeality within revisionist ceremonies. Yuki's 
olfactory senses are piqued and she is aware of the effects the Bunraku ritual has on her 
body and mind. For even a brief moment, Yuki considers her self holistically, perhaps as 
a totalized existence. 
' In Pat Cadigan. Tea from an Empty Cup. (New York: Tor, 1998). 
^ In Shaviro, Steven Connected, or what it means to live in the network society. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003). 
^ In Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
In Hansen, Mark B.N. New Philosophy for New Media. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004). 
' In "Exchange with Pat Cadigan: Queen of Cyberpunk." 3 Nov. 1998. Media-in-Transition. 28 February 
2005. <http://mediaintransition.mit.edu/science_fiction/transcripts/cadigan_index.html> 
^ In Graham J. Murphy. "Imaginable Futures: Tea from an Empty Cup and the Notion of Nation" 
Extrapolation, Summer 2004 v45 i2; pl45 (17). 
' In Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. (New York: Verso, 1991). 
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Chapter 4 
The "flesh-ghost in Market Street": 
Bodies without Organs in All Tomorrow's Parties 
And what costume shall the poor girl wear 
To all tomorrow's parties 
For Thursday's child is Sunday's clown 
For whom none will go mourning 
-The Velvet Underground, "All Tomorrow's Parties" 
William Gibson's revision of his own theory on bodily transcendence is perhaps 
the most substantive evidence of the transition of cyberpunk literature into a post-
cyberpunk mode. Gibson established the tropes of early cyberpunk in Neuromancer 
(1984) and molded the themes that the genre would come to be known by. As was 
discussed in chapter one, Gibson characterized the body as a flesh "prison" or "meat" in 
his early work, and in so doing created a philosophy which subordinated a decadent 
corporeality to the informational network of cyberspace. The task of early cyberpunk, 
following in Gibson's footsteps, was to conceptualize an apotheosis of the mind into 
digitization (or pure information). Under the aegis of escape from embodied 
imprisonment, cyberpunk committed to a praxis of disembodiment. Gibsonian cyberpunk 
maintained until very recently the philosophy that control over identity and data pattems 
could only occur for humans within cyberspace; that is, until Gibson rethought the 
importance of materiality with his novel All Tomorrow's Parties (1999).' 
Gibson takes the title of his text from the Velvet Underground dirge for the 
fleeting neo-Epicurean days of psychedelic drug use and avant garde escapist art. The 
Velvet's song appeared on their Andy Warhol-produced debut studio album. Gibson 
draws on the song's themes of terminal partying, progressive artistic and social 
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movements' inevitable reckoning with cooption and eventual disdain by 'hip' circles. The 
allusion is perfectly fitting when we consider All Tomorrow's Parties {ATP) as a revision 
of Gibson's foundational cyberpunk ideas. First, the isolationism and de-regulated 
autonomy prescribed for cyberspace, cited in the opening chapter, has proven overly 
idealistic and been transfigured by pragmatism. Like the costumed partygoer of the song 
who is a vogue participant one day and the target of ridicule the next, the literary 
conception of a nascent cyberspace in cyberpunk fiction has undergone a maturity from 
optimism into replication of the status quo. ATP is set shortly after the millennium 
transition, and the web that Gibson knows looks drastically like the capitalist corporate 
culture it once sought to escape. Secondly, the lament (or mouming) for idealized 
cyberspace's death is absent. The apathy over cyberspace's (and by extension 
cyberpunk's) descent into banality is eerily paralleled by the lack of feeling over the 
counter-cultural figure's downfall into laughing stock that the Velvets sing of. Gibson has 
grounded cyberpunk within the teleological pattern that the Velvet Underground has 
established for subversive movements in the twentieth century: the progressive parties of 
today will not last and will not be missed tomorrow. 
While some critics and authors would argue that the cyberpunk movement is 
bound for a telos of insignificance, Gibson seems to be making every effort to retool the 
philosophies of the genre in order to maintain its relevance. In the particular context of 
Gibson's novel, the cyberpunk ontology of embodiment can be seen to potentially resist 
increasingly virtual corporate and capitalist systems. ATP marks two significant shifts 
away from the bodily transcendent philosophy formed in Neuromancer and in the texts of 
cyberpunk authors that immediately followed. First, Gibson reverses the trope of the 
cyberpunk leaving his/her body behind and mapping consciousness onto cyberspace. 
Instead of diagnosing efforts in postmodernism to transform the physical into the digital, 
Gibson examines the ways in which seemingly non-material phenomenons in the 
contemporary economic market are represented by emergent informational systems 
manifesting themselves physically. In other words, digital systems and personas become 
real and have a tangible impact on the material space of the global market. Gibson 
explores this dialogue between the virtual and the material in the figure of the pop culture 
Rei Toei who looms large over the narrative. Toei is a digital entity known as an "idoru," 
a cyberspace celebrity "who didn't physically exist" (15). At every tum, the Toei system, 
embodied in the figure of Rei Toei, seeks a way to materialize into the real world, 
progressing from digital to physical. She is "the ultimate expression of entertainment 
software" and her "audience knows that she does not walk among them; that she is 
media, purely" (55). However, even as a disembodied individual, Rei Toei develops an 
Eros, a life drive that is the catalyst for her to become human and emerge into 
embodiment. Here, Gibson completes the reversal of early cyberpunk assessments of the 
relationship between human flesh and human consciousness: existence on the 
informational plane is the new prison and only substantiation can spring a person. 
Gibson's exploration of digital systems interacting with physical beings represents a 
departure from early cyberpunk ontologies of consciousness and body; he examines 
media information and programs (that formerly existed in cyberspace) in order to show 
^he tremendous impact those coded apparatuses have in our daily, reality-based lives. 
Secondly, Gibson creates another reconstructed contact point between digital 
information and physicality with the mysterious "syndrome." The denizens of the San 
Francisco/Oakland Bay Area in ATP are susceptible to infection by information network, 
which results in an altered perception and increased vulnerability to corporate messages 
that invade the mind and body. Carriers of the syndrome somatically register the ebb and 
flow of information in the world, and their health is simultaneously affected by the 
capriciousness of media influence. For instance, the novel's protagonist, Laney, is 
depleted by the syndrome (economically and in terms of his health) and forced to live in 
the shanty town of cardboard box homes that serve as a quarantined ghetto for the 
afflicted (1). When his caretaker brings his medical supplies, Laney peers out with the 
"red wink of a diode. Cables. Faint gleam of the interface" (3). He is sick, but he is 
unable to disconnect himself from his captor. The syndrome breeds dependence upon 
information, requiring the individual to use cyberspace interface like the heroin junkie 
relying on the needle. Cognizant of his addict-like relationship with corporate messaging, 
Laney coughs and confesses "Tm in deep, now'" (3). Yet, even though the syndrome 
has forced Laney to crave information that ultimately makes him little more than a 
composite of brand messages, the illness grants Laney an unexpected ability. He is able 
to perceive informational patterns (their origins, destinations, and intentions) and 
manipulate them.^ Laney acts as a sort of moderator, capable of changing the content of 
information bound for other global citizens. He remains wholly incapable of curing his 
own condition, but the intoxicant that made him hyper-receptive to messages of control 
has also made him "part of the node" (6). Observers are fascinated by Laney's abilities; 
"Yamazaki has seen what Laney can do with data, and what data can do to Lane/' (6). 
Laney is fragmented, ill, and outcast from society. He is precisely the kind of 
schizophrenic figure that Deleuze and Guattari, in Anti-Oedipus, claim capitalist social 
conditions produce. Socially unintelligible because of disunity in the psyche, the 
schizophrenic is not a purely biological illness but a psychic condition that 
deterritiorialized the subject rendering it incapable of codifying its place in the system. 
Deleuze and Guattari use schizophrenia to diagnosis of the social phenomenon of 
alienation and marginalization in late capitalism, and refer to the individual victim as the 
body without organs (9)} The body without organs (bwo) does not denote a body missing 
corporeal organs, but a body that is not organized, controlled, and disciplined by market 
conditions. Laney must also be considered as a body without organs even though the 
informational syndrome determines his health. This is because the market organization 
and control of Laney is incomplete; he reconstructs information waves in the ether of the 
world market before the system itself can contact other users. He is not fettered and 
controlled as prisoner stripped of social agency, but operates on the margins of society as 
schizophrenic and disordered. Hence, Gibson utilizes the radical possibility of the 
schizo/bwo figure in the fashion that Deleuze and Guattari envision when they claim: 
"The schizophrenic deliberately seeks out the very limit of capitalism; he is its inherent 
tendency brought to fulfillment, its surplus product, its proletariat, and its exterminating 
angel" (35). According to Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism 'naturally' creates peripheral 
figures, or, those not easily integrated into the normative consumptive/productive model 
of labor. For reasons of mental instability, social unintelligibility, or civil disobedience, 
the schizophrenic figure does not possess the coherence necessary to be monitored and 
inscribed by the capitalist system that created him/her. Laney's disunity achieves its 
emancipatory potential when he redeploys the veritable schizophrenia that information 
flow infects him with, using it to interrupt the capitalist networks of consumer 
surveillance. Laney sees "some kind of state change, some global shift in the nature of his 
perception" and immerses himself in the network stream to help shape the new order 
(13). 
Through the themes of materialized data and subversive schizophrenia, Gibson 
makes his contribution to the new episteme of post-cyberpunk. He moves the 
manipulation of data flow out of cyberspace and into reality, positing that digital markets 
can be altered/disrupted by the bodies that consume them (Laney) and are produced by 
them (Rei Toei). 
Capitalist Information Market 
\nATP, capitalism creates an incessant drive for media consumption. The medical 
researcher Yamazaki looks out upon the city and sees not the urban warrens that create 
community, but the "sign and signifier" of "the unending ritual of commerce, of desire. 
Vast faces fill the screens, icons of beauty at once terrible and banal" (6). The face of 
humanity is for the novel an iconic media presence, a harbinger of a terrible desire to be 
inundated with information. The (literal and figurative) body politic is information that 
takes on a human form. The floating cameras that survey everything, recording human 
activity and uploading their findings into cyberspace are referred to as "disembodied 
eye[s]" (35). Signs of informational data that has lumbered into real existence, broken 
free from cyberspace, are everywhere in the text, such as Laney's perception that network 
information is spatially very near him (106) or Harwood's attempt to "hack reality 
(209). Even the urban organization of the "net people" resembles "a big communal 
85 
website" (47). Gibson crafts a dystopic sculpture of pervasive information-driven 
economics. The market that thrives on intangible, distilled media products imbeds itself 
deeply in the social order, so much so that the human gaze upon the world can only 
discern matter in terms of cyberspace mimicry. The web comes alive as a person and 
monitors us as a warden. 
Never is the power of the information industry more palpable than in the novel's 
discussion concerning the color of computers in chapter 26. The visual artist, Chevette, 
asks a hardware dealer why all computers are aesthetically the same. He responds that the 
beige coloring "was to help people in the workplace be more comfortable with radically 
new technologies that would eventually result in the mutation or extinction of the 
workplace" (111). According to this theory, by eliminating consumer choice the 
computer industry creates homogeneity and can effectively control individual use of the 
machines. When consumers become comfortable with computers, the workplace is 
transformed and modes of production move away from physical goods, instead 
constructing intangible ones. Thus, the market for informational products responds to the 
increased availability, and the informational networks that host these products achieves 
greater importance in our economic lives. While this is a much condensed version of the 
economic evolution of the computer industry that Gibson cites, it is a fair account of the 
actual history. 
The homogeneity capitalism creates under the aegis of informational superiority is 
quite potent in destroying subcultural resistance. The bohemia enclaves of progressive 
art, communal living, and counter-cultural/economic organizations mATP have been 
stripped of the resistant distance from dominant culture thanks to the continual 
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surveillance of information networks. The disembodied eyes that report on daily city life 
(like some reality TV show run amok) have "encouraged walk-on tourism" in the 
bohemian sectors (174). Gibson writes that the interest sparked by constant media 
barrage is "a crucial aspect of normalization" (174). As the voyeurism and tourism 
become more penetrating in the text, "the mechanisms of recommodification [become] 
quicker, more rapacious" (174). The information industry packages counter-cultural 
practices and ideas as commodities and the exploited bohemians face the difficult task of 
turning away the media eye in order to retain a degree of agency. Chevette and her 
documentary filmmaker friend, Tessa, decide to "document the [bohemia] life before it's 
theme-parked" (67). Gibson's scenario suggests that as delimited information exchange 
becomes more thorough, it can also become so pervasive that its pejorative effects creep 
beyond the bounds of cyberspace and into reality. 
Rei Toei: Emergent System 
Gibson takes great pleasure in plajdng with the postmodern notions of bricolage, 
the overlap of artistic boundaries, using the Baudrillardian simulacra culture to show how 
the unreal, or digital reproductions, penetrate real social spaces, dissolving the clear 
distinctions between the authentic and inauthentic. When Chevette is told that the 
cyberspace celebrity Rei Toei "doesn't exist," the explanation for Toei's non-existence is 
that "[tjhere's no live girl there at all. She's code. Software" (69). Toei is "[hjundred 
percent unreal" because she doesn't have a physicality. The bedrock early cyberpunk 
philosophic stance claimed that even non-physical, digital presence was real if it could 
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be engaged in cyberspace. ATP revises this stance by judging entities based upon their 
physical existence, or the possibility of achieving materiality. 
Rei Toei falls into the category of an informational being with the potential to be 
material. In fact, Laney s quest in the novel is to ensure that Rei Toei is able to transcend 
the digital web space and step foot into reality. Laney observes the nodal points, or points 
of informational genesis and propulsion, where Toei begins to become physical (55, 163-
64). Laney helps construct a new kind of media projector that allows digital images to be 
made tangible. Through use of the projector, Toei "simply continued to emerge, to be, to 
be more. More present" (164). Toei's emergence is not simply Laney's quixotic fantasy, 
but a suppressed desire of the populace to instantiate media icons. She is "a love object 
sprung from an approximation of the global mass unconscious" (164). 
Laney succeeds in ushering Rei Toei into reality, facilitating her embodiment at 
the cathedrals of corporate consumerism- the Lucky Dragon convenient store chain. After 
hacking the information system, Laney hijacks the nodal points of Lucky Dragon 
commercials and uploads the emergent Rei Toei program into the mainframe of the chain 
store. Simultaneously, all over the globe, consumers see Toei "on every last screen, 
walking out of every Lucky Dragon" (269). The nanofax machines of the Lucky Dragon 
"slides up and out crawls, unfolds sort of, this butt-naked girl, black hair, maybe Chinese, 
Japanese" (268). Laney has given the information life. He examines the media projector 
that ferried Toei from cyberspace into actual space and decides the machine no longer 
contains her" nor do virtual limits (275). She is a socially intelligible being, as much 
history, no more, no less than the crude yet wistfully dainty vases pounded out of shell 
casings in some French trench" (275-6). 
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Laney at the Center of Change 
Laney is motivated to assist Rei Toei s articulation in reality, in part, because he 
is sympathetic to her existential crisis. Toei is sullen and incomplete in digital form. 
Without physical existence, her identity is partial, and "[s]he doesn't know herself 
(250). She even attempted a marriage to the human pop singer, Rez, as a means of 
fulfilling her physical wishes, though the coupling doesn't work (55). There is a vacancy 
in Toei's subjectivity that parallels Laney's own void. The information syndrome that 
ostracizes him from society and relegates him to the quarantine cardboard city creates a 
gaping wound in his psyche: "That hole at the core of Laney's being, that underlying 
absence, he begins to suspect, is not so much an absence in the self as o/the self (71). 
Laney's identity is disturbed because he lacks the controlling apparatus for his 
subjectivity. He is the quintessential postmodem subject, incapable of pinpointing his 
place in the world market and incapable of affecting agency. He sees himself as "a 
Laney-colored smear, meaningless without context. A microscopic cog in some 
catastrophic plan. But positioned, he senses, centrally" (72). The syndrome that 
commodifies his humanity and reduces him to informational data that is quantifiable in 
the marketplace has actually shown him the fissures in the system. His excised humanity 
thrusts him to both the margins of society and directly to the center, where he sees 
firsthand the machinations of the media industry. 
From his place at the center of data patterns, Laney sees that "everything is 
changing" and he is capable of perceiving this "change emerging from vast flows of data 
(56). The change that Laney sees in the system of commerciaUsm is the potential to 
redirect information flow to amend damaged embodied subjectivity. Since "nothing is 
lost within the system, an individual capable of seeing the lines and boundaries of the 
system is able to enact some control over it. Laney lectures a fellow syndrome patient on 
the subversive possibilities for users near the locus of change (136). He claims that 
physicality and geography can be manipulated by data. Even history, a principle deemed 
dead by postmodern critics, can be revitalized: "History was plastic, was a matter of 
interpretation. The digital had not so much changed that as made it too obvious to ignore. 
History was stored data, subject to manipulation and interpretation" (165). In a practical 
sense, what Laney wants to do is change the informational messages that construct an 
objectified and disenfranchising positionality for human beings in the market place. 
Laney wishes to alter the ''shape of every narrative, every version" of post-humanity 
in order to restore individuality. 
The market govemance that infects individuals, declares them socially dead, and 
reduces them to non-entities is exemplary of what Gibson calls the interstitial condition 
(33). Meaning literally "between things," the interstitial human, like Laney, is afforded 
neither autonomy/choice nor recognition as a social being. These subjects exist between 
product and consumer, the recipient of informational goods and the goods themselves. 
They are fleshly beings graphitied with information. At a poignant moment, Laney 
characterizes himself as a "Flesh-ghost in Market Street" (136). Gibson's metaphor 
works brilliantly as representation of the condemned and terminal, yet economically 
consumable network user. Laney's ontology is residual yet fiinctional in the capitalist 
exchange. However, Gibson provides his character with a way out of his commodified 
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role, rearticulate the invasive information flows that you are a part of. In effect, Laney is 
the schizo figure whose body without organs can threaten the dominant structure. 
In their survey of postmodern theory, Steve Best and Douglas Kellner explain the 
subversive capacity of Deleuze and Guattari's schizophrenic. They write: "For Deleuze 
and Guattari, the paradigm of the revolutionary is not the disciplined party man, but the 
schizo-subject, the one who resists the capitalist axiomatic unscrambles the social 
codes, and breaks through the walls of reterritorialization into the realm of flows, 
intensities, and becoming, thereby threatening the whole capitalist order" (91-2).'' Laney 
performs the subversive rituals precisely as they are described. He decodes the 
informational patterns of corporate and media culture to perceive the immanent change. 
He aids Rei Toei's becoming physical. Most importantly, he shakes free of the passivity 
the market conditions in people. 
Gibson titles the chapter in which Laney becomes fiilly aware of his new 
subjectivity "Panopticon." The invocation of Foucault's theory on surveillance power 
dynamics and discipline begins the paradigm shift Laney authors. The chapter begins 
such: "Laney's progress through all the data in the world (or that data's progress through 
him) has long since become what he is, rather than something he merely does" (163). 
Laney himself emerges as controller of information, a filter through which data passes 
and mutates. As opposed to being confined and regulated by data, clasped in an 
informational straightj acket, Laney becomes ephemeral and redirects the data outward 
into the network once it is stripped of its commodifying sub-routines. Laney enacts his 
agency on productive forces as a body without organs. He refuses to be organized and 
patrolled by information markets. Deleuze and Guattari note that in this process of 
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peripheral participation in capitalism, "the body without organs now falls back on (se 
rabat sur) desiring production, attracts it, and appropriates it for its own" (11). Laney's 
schizophrenic syndrome and mutable physical/informational subjectivity conjoin in what 
Deleuze and Guattari see as "the two aspects of [capitalist] process." Here, "the 
metaphysical process that puts us in contact with the ''demoniacal' element in nature or 
within the heart of the earth, and the historical process of social production that restores 
the autonomy of desiring-machines in relation to the deterritiorialized social machine. 
Schizophrenia is desiring-production as the limit of social production" (35). 
Additionally, Laney is at the helm of a new ontology of embodied human 
subjectivity. By perpetrating the return of the digital entity into embodiment, he "bring[s] 
forth some sort of new reality" (163). The philosophy of being changes course to 
consider digital to physical progression as evidence of post-humanity. Even more 
progressive is Laney's confrontation of the panoptic information network. Though he 
accepts the Foucauldian postulation that one cannot step completely outside of ideology, 
Laney (and ostensibly Gibson) believes that reclamation is a possible tactic for 
subversive gains. Once immersed in the information flow and capable of controlling its 
impact on reality from the nodal points, Laney assumes a subjectivity that subsumes the 
paradigmatic power structure. "It is as though he becomes a single retina, distributed 
evenly across the inner surface of a sphere. Unblmking, he stares, globally, into that eye" 
(167). Laney stares back at the Panopticon, now an edifice of surveillance, control, and 
power himself. Gibson posits the argument that the digital street is not one way; though 
consumers are watched by informational mechanisms, the gaze can be reversed by the 
individual, and humans can monitor the positive and negative effects information carries. 
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This is the semi-autonomy from economy and society that post-cyberpunk has borrowed 
from its cyberpunk antecedent and reformed for embodied use. 
Refamiliarizing the Body 
Gibson s insistence upon embodiment in A TP has an accompanying restored 
relationship between cyberpunks and the flesh. Throughout the novel, characters seem to 
be refamiliarizing themselves with their bodies. After a gruelmg night of pattern 
recognition, Laney attends to personal hygiene. "Laney tastes blood. It is a long time 
since he has brushed his teeth, and they feel artificial and ill-fitting, a though in his 
absence they have been replaced with a stranger's" (222). We get the sense that Laney 
has been estranged by corporeality, but the process of embodying information flows has 
generated a new awareness of his flesh. Earlier, when confronting the diabolical 
corporate architect of subliminal product messaging, Laney becomes "suddenly and 
terribly aware of his physical being, the condition of his body" (178). The proposition of 
an additional disenfranchising informational strand prompts Laney's anxieties over 
bodily harm. It is impossible for the subject (in this post-cyberpunk context) to forget the 
maledictions bound for the flesh. 
Gibson revises the simulacra production of information that erodes corporeal 
importance and urges individuals towards digitized post-humanity. Even the most 
successful producers of ephemeral information are suspect to the possibility of a physical, 
embodied entity emerging from under their wings. At the close of the novel, a traveler 
mulls those "whose mills grind increasingly fine, toward some unimaginable omega-
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point of pure information, some prodigy perpetually on the brink of arrival" (273). The 
threat of data instantiated and arrived is perpetual. This is the philosophical break 
between Gibson s cyberpunk and his post-cyberpunk periods; humans are no longer 
always on the verge of retreating into digitality, we are always on the verge of becoming 
embodied in new ways. 
The social unintelligibility of Laney as a Deleuzian and Guattarian body without 
organs enables him to partially step outside of the hypnotic information flow that has 
entranced postmodern subjects. He is capable of articulating his own relationship to 
capitalist "nodal points," utilizing the revolutionary potential of the schizophrenic as the 
human immune to rigid ordering and control. Laney is interstitial in his liminality, but his 
semi-autonomy is secured through his meddling in the media schema, orchestrating Rei 
Toei's emergence as a posthuman entity (165). Gibson represents Laney's seizure of 
productive capability as agency. He acts as an artificer of posthuman life by producing 
from within the informational corporate media system a being capable of operating 
independently of it. 
' In William Gibson. All Tomorrow's Parties (New York: Ace Fiction, 1999). 
^ Laney's sensitivity to information flow (and Gibson's most recent novel, Pattern Recognition) echoes 
Alfred Bester's short story "The Pi Man," in which a semi-coherent man claims to be able to see the system 
patterns of the world and restore balance or equilibrium when needed. 
^ In Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis; 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983). i ir j 
" In Steven Best and Douglas Kellner. Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations (New York: Guilford 
Press, 1991). 
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Conclusion 
The Body is a Ship and I am Captain: 
Subjects Emerging Through Information Waves 
Fuck cyberpunk. That was the language ofNerdic interface, not fusion. A prosthetic limb is the drift^'ood 
of the expanded body ... It is all the same synthetic flesh 
-Rob Hardin, "Technophilia's Last IVavc 
If cyberpunk is dead, or at the very least dying, and post-cyberpunk is revealing 
itself to be the sub-cultural successor, then what do the revised ontological positions of 
the genre say about our current state? What immediate impact do the existential truths of 
posthumanist subjectivity have for our contemporary, daily lives? 
Throughout this project I have been arguing for the reformist potential that I see, 
and that post-cyberpunk authors see, in the mutable subject. The individual who is able to 
revise the signposts of subjectivity, mind and body, in conjunction, is capable of an 
agency not thought possible in postmodernism. Unlike the Enlightenment conception of 
self-mastery that achieved determinism and knowledge through domination of nature, the 
posthumanist artificer additionally disenchants the information network that held human 
autonomy in its grasp. As we have seen, the body in the late capital marketplace is 
seldom considered the domain of the self, but rather a canvas on which economic and 
informational messaging can be scrawled. This bleak assessment does not allow for self-
reliance and does not see the body as a mechanism in connection with the individual. 
However, post-cyberpunk theorizes the individual in control of his/her flesh, and 
investigates how one might use that control to dictate the information that purportedly 
alienates us from our corporeality. Since information brands the body, and information is 
made efficacious by the body, the artificer's manipulation of the fleshly mediating device 
of information thus partly changes the meaning of network information itself. 
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In his book Our Posthuman Future, Francis Fukuyama decrees that state control 
is needed to regulate advances in biotechnology.that threaten our spiritual and physical 
existence. Specifically, the rise of nanotechnology, microscopic informational and 
cybernetic devices implanted in the body, signals that posthuman reality is on the 
precipice. Fukuyama believes that having facilitated such thorough and (potentially) 
deterministic reconfiguration of the human body, science offers great promise and great 
danger. He claims that "science and technology, from which the modem world springs, 
themselves represent our civilization's key vulnerabilities" (xii). Fukuyama sees 
nanotechnology moving us collectively into "a 'posthuman' stage of history" that will 
alter our humanity beyond all recognition (7). While Fukuyama's humanist concerns are 
understandable, I believe he underestimates the philosophical merit of nanotechnology's 
emancipatory potential. If biotechnology has a tacit potential for abuse that would rupture 
notions of humanness, is it not possible to also deploy that same technology for radical 
purposes of individuality? 
The humanity of K.W. Jeter's cutthroat information market discussed in chapter 
one could certainly be an existence one would seek to alter. If you recall, Jeter's Noir 
portrays people in a late capitalist society who actively seek out exploitation and abuse at 
the hands of corporations in order to cling to a mystical and commodified sense of 
consumer purpose. Transcendence is sold through the purchase of goods that, in a not so 
veiled manner, condition the individual to be more receptive to product messages. Jeter 
describes this phenomenon as naturalized rape amongst customers who are always 
looking to "get topped, the harder and bloodier, the better" (315). McNihil uses 
biotechnology to alter his vision (and olfactory senses) as a means of inoculating himself 
against the pervasiveness of messaging. Dehberately engaging in the reworking of 
humanness for personal aesthetic purposes, McNihil perpetrates exactly the sort of self-
determined medical manipulation that Fukuyama sees as an abuse of nanotechnology. 
However, McNihil's use of cybernetics to fortify his existence against disenfranchising 
elements speaks to the potential radicalism and practicality of non-sanctioned, or "street", 
corporeal reconfiguration and the pertinence of post-cyberpunk meditations on protean 
subjectivity. 
Efforts by Richard K. Morgan, Pat Cadigan, and William Gibson (in his recent 
works) to animate embodied subjects in their fiction reflect not only changing conditions 
in information technology, but speak to the recent discoveries in cognitive science and 
theory. Andy Clark has been instrumental in placing new philosophical and synaptic 
understandings of subjectivity into dialogue with one another. Clark recognizes that any 
new ground broken in the workings of human mental processes must take into account 
accompanying physical and social truths, hi his study of cognitive science, Mindware 
(2001), Clark disputes existence of a "core agent" residing in consciousness that could be 
distilled and retained in unchanged form, even if the body is jeopardized. He notes this 
"core agent" is vulnerable to shifts in the internal and external "support systems" that 
surround it (158).^ Any discussion of cognition must spin outward to reconcile with 
perceptive mechanisms (memories) and physicality (the body), exploring cognition as an 
embodied process that ultimately makes a statement about subjectivity, hi this regard, 
Clark supports post-cyberpunk's fascination with linking the mind to the body. Also, 
Clark's system of what he calls connectionism (of consciousness to corporeality and of 
individual to information network) concisely applies the ontological theories of post-
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cyberpunk to the discussions of cognitive existence that shape our behefs in humanity 
and our humanness. 
Reintroducing the human body into a cold and alienating postmodern urbanity is 
part of post-cyberpunk's social agenda. Confronting the decadent city with the flesh 
(rather than digitization) gives the individual a new site to examine identity within 
dominant structures. The swell of the city no longer spurs on a retreat to the computer, 
but is met with emboldened approach by the street walker. This contrast of the vulnerable 
body to the monolithic city space is not unique to post-cyberpunk. The photographer 
Spencer Tunick has devoted much of his career to confrontations of the flesh and urban 
stone/steel. Tunick's installation art of naked people lying in a prostrate sea at the heart of 
the world's metropolises (Moscow, Sydney, New York) poses provocative questions 
about the significance of the human body and the juxtaposition of intimate personal and 
public spheres, hi relation to post-cyberpunk, Tunick uses corporeality as a means of 
reclaiming the human capacity to transform postmodem space. His work exemplifies the 
resonance of post-cyberpunk issues within the contemporary art community. 
Methodologies of articulating subjectivity may differ in the aforementioned disciplines; 
yet a rebellious capacity seems innate in each scientific and artistic outlet that boldly 
engages the problem of how to re/place the self in the world order. 
By constructing identity, the posthumanist subject denounces the social 
institutions that claim jurisdiction and monopoly over network citizenship. Instead, the 
body is a workshop for human identity, where the subject is proprietor. In effect, post-
cyberpunk facilitates a restoration of the revolutionary claims of modernization. Through 
the functions of technology that allow for computer/organic interface, and subsequent 
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embrace of the posthuman condition as one with positivistic potential, human beings 
become both the subjects and objects of modernization. Marshall Berman believes that 
modernization's reduction of humanity to object of progress and the simultaneous call 
into subjectivity through the progress speaks of the emancipatory possibility of 
concomitant human/technological procession. The dual registers of object and subject 
"give them [men and women] the power to change the world that is changing them, to 
make their way through the maelstrom and make it their own" (16).'^ 
Simple navigation of the world is too often given credence in postmodern 
criticism as acceptable participation for humans. The network power structures are 
internalized as unassailable, and individuals are conceived of as the passive recipients 
and reflectors of that network information. Autonomy is dead in postmodemity, long live 
market forces. That defeatism is unacceptable in the modemization scope of agency 
conceived of by Berman, and it is certainly a heretic philosophy for the posthumanists in 
recent cyberpunk. Berman calls for ownership in the world and the capacity for change-
two concepts postmodemity seems at best allergic to and at worst foreclosed from. 
However, in imagining a philosophy that encourages the individual to dictate the 
embodiment of network information, post-cyberpunk begins to fulfill Berman's mandate 
that men and women assume ownership of the world that manipulates their identities and 
morphs their existence. 
The clandestine lure of cybernetics for the posthumanist is not a quest for ballast 
in a frantic, homogenous market. Cybernetics offer mutability of the self, a retort to 
evolving brand messages that cling to the body. If any sort of reclamation of power is to 
take place, it must start on an individual level; it must start with the body. Post-
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cyberpunk's true achievement is the articulation of a self-built ontology, one that 
recognizes the human body as a signifier of subjectivity that might be transformed agam 
and again, always in protest of capitalist inscription and in declaration of autonomy. 
Fears over the death blow to aesthetics at the digital hands of media technology 
and informatics are, in light of recent posthumanist cyberpunk philosophies, narrow-
minded. For the twenty-first century peers longingly towards a new manifestation of 
progressive artistry that hybridizes technological, informational, and corporeal mediums. 
The messianic figure is a radical artificer. We have arrived in an age where societal 
convalescence begins with remaking the self. 
' In Hardin, Rob. Distorture. (Illinois: Fiction Collective Two, 1998) p.141. 
^ In Francis Fukuyama. Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. (New 
York; Picador, 2002). 
^ In Andy Clark. Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science. (New York; Oxford 
UP, 2001). 
'' In Marshall Berman. All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity. (New York; Penguin, 
1982). Herman's thoughts on the simultaneous emergence as subject and object of modernization are 
explored, in their negative potential, by Claudia Springer. In her book on cybernetic bodies and desire. 
Electronic Eros, Springer writes that "those who adulate technology's penetration of the human body and 
mind can lose sight of how the attempt to become a technological object leads inevitably to extinction" (7). 
The extinction of humanity is averted in Herman's schema because the human has some control in the 
process of modernization by ovraing the realization of subjectivity, using it as a torch to guide one's path 
through the modem world. In Claudia Springer. Electronic Eros: Bodies and Desire in the Postindustrial 
Age. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996). 
